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1  Introduction 
This  paper  studies  the  following  problem:  how  stable  over  time  are  the 
so-called  "structural  parameters"  of  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilib 
rium  (DSGE)  models?  To  answer  this  question,  we  estimate  a  medium 
scale  DSGE  model  with  real  and  nominal  rigidities,  using  U.S.  data.  In 
our model,  we  allow  for parameter  drifting  and  rational  expectations  of 
the  agents  with  respect  to  this  drift.  We  document  that  there  is  strong 
evidence  that  parameters  change  within  our  sample.  In particular,  we 
illustrate  variations  in  the  parameters  describing  the monetary  policy 
reaction  function  and  in  the  parameters  characterizing  the  pricing  be 
havior  of  firms  and  households.  Moreover,  we  show  how  the move 
ments  in  the  pricing  parameters  are  correlated  with  inflation.  Thus,  our 
results  cast  doubts  on  the  empirical  relevance  of Calvo  models. 
Our  findings  are  important  because  DSGE  models  are  at  the  core  of 
modern  macroeconomics.  They  promise  to  be  a  laboratory  that  re 
searchers  can  employ  to  match  theory  with  reality,  to design  economic 
policy,  and  to evaluate  welfare.  The  allure  of DSGE  models  has  captured 
the  imagination  of many,  inside  and  outside  academia.  In universities,  a 
multitude  of  economists  implement  DSGE  models  in  their  rich  varieties 
and  fashions.  More  remarkable  still,  a burgeoning  number  of  policy 
making  institutions  are  estimating  DSGE  models  for  policy  analysis 
and  forecasting.  The  Federal  Reserve  Board  (Erceg,  Guerrieri,  and  Gust 
2006),  the  European  Central  Bank  (Christoffel,  Coenen,  and  Warne 
2007),  the  Bank  of Canada  (Murchison  and  Rennison  2006),  the  Bank  of 
Sweden  (Adolfson,  Laseen,  Linde,  and  Villani  2005),  and  the  Bank  of 
Spain  (Andres,  Burriel  and  Estrada  2006)  are  at  the  leading  edge  of  the 
tide,  but  a dozen  other  institutions  are  jumping  on  the  bandwagon.  In 84  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
addition,  economists  are  accumulating  experience  with  the  good  fore 
casting  record  of DSGE  models,  even  when  compared  with  judgmental 
predictions  from  staff  economists  (Christoffel,  Coenen,  and  Warne, 
2007). 
At  the  center  of DSGE  models  we  have  the  "structural  parameters" 
that  define  the preferences  and  technology  of  the  economy.  We  call  these 
parameters  "structural"  in  the  sense  of Hurwicz  (1962):  they  are  invari 
ant  to  interventions,  including  shocks  by  nature.  The  structural  charac 
ter  of  the  parameters  is  responsible  for much  of  the  appeal  of  DSGE 
models.  Since  the  parameters  are  fully  interpretable  from  the  perspec 
tive  of  economic  theory  and  invariant  to  policy  interventions,  DSGE 
models  avoid  the Lucas  critique  and  can  be  used  to quantitatively  eval 
uate  policy. 
Our  point  of  departure  is  that,  at  least  at  some  level,  it  is hard  to be 
lieve  that  the  "structural  parameters"  of DSGE  models  are  really  struc 
tural,  given  the  class  of  interventions  we  are  interested  in for policy  anal 
ysis.  Let  us  think,  for  instance,  about  technology.  Most  DSGE  models 
specify  a  stable  production  function,  perhaps  subject  to  productivity 
growth.  Except  in  a  few  papers  (Young  2004),  the  features  of  the  tech 
nology,  like  the  elasticity  of  output  to capital,  are  constant  over  time.  But 
this  constant  elasticity  is  untenable  in  a world  where  technological 
change  is purposeful.  We  can  expect  that  changes  in relative  input  prices 
will  induce  changes  in  the  new  technologies  developed  and  that  those 
may  translate  into  different  elasticities  of  output  to  inputs.  Similar  ar 
guments  can  be made  along  nearly  every  dimension  of  a  modern  DSGE 
model. 
The  previous  argument  is not  sufficient  to dismiss  the practice  of  esti 
mating  DSGE  models  with  constant  parameter  values.  Simplifying  as 
sumptions,  like  stable  parameters,  are  required  to  make  progress  in eco 
nomics.  However,  as  soon  as we  realize  the possible  changing  nature  of 
structural  parameters,  we  weaken  the  justifications  for  inference  exer 
cises  underlying  the  program  of  DSGE  modeling.  The  separation  be 
tween  what  is  "structural"  and  what  is  reduced  form  becomes  much 
more 
ambiguous.1 
The  possibility  but  not  the  necessity  of  parameter  drifting  motivates 
the main  question  of  this  paper:  how  much  evidence  of  parameter  drift 
ing  in DSGE  models  is  in  the  data?  If  the  answer  is  that we  find much 
support  for drifting  (where  the metric  to decide  "much"  needs  to be  dis 
cussed),  we  would  have  to  reevaluate  the  usefulness  of  our  estimation 
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Moreover,  parameter  drifting  may  also  be  interpreted  as  a sign  of model 
misspecification  and,  possibly,  as  a guide  for  improving  our models.  If 
the  answer  is negative?that  is,  if  we  find  little  parameter  drifting?we 
would  increase  our  confidence  in DSGE  models  as  a procedure  to  tackle 
relevant  policy  discussions. 
Beyond  addressing  our  substantive  question,  this paper  also  develops 
new  tools  for  the  estimation  of  dynamic  equilibrium  models  with  pa 
rameter  drifting.  We  show  how  the  combination  of  perturbation  meth 
ods  and  the  particle  filter  allows  the  efficient  estimation  of  this  class  of 
economies.  Indeed,  all  the  required  computations  can  be  performed  on 
an  average  personal  computer  in a  reasonable  amount  of  time. We  hope 
that  those  tools may  be  put  to good  use  in other  applications,  not  neces 
sarily  in general  equilibrium,  that  involve  time-varying  parameters  in 
essential  ways. 
Our  main  results  are  as  follows.  First,  we  offer  compelling  proof  of 
changing  parameters  in the Fed's  behavior.  Monetary  policy  became  ap 
preciably  more  aggressive  in  its  stand  against  inflation  after  Volcker's 
appointment.  This  agrees  with  Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler  (2000),  Lubick 
and  Schorfheide  (2004),  Boivin  (2006),  and  Rabanal  (2007).  Our  contri 
bution  is to rederive  the  result  within  a  model  where  agents  understand 
and  act  upon  the  fact  that monetary  policy  changes  over  time. 
Second,  we  expose  the  instability  of  the  parameters  controlling  the 
level  of  nominal  rigidity  and  indexation  of  prices  and  wages.  Those 
changes  are  strongly  correlated  with  changes  in  inflation  in an  intuitive 
way:  lower  rigidities  correlate  with  higher  inflation  and  higher  rigidities 
with  lower  inflation.  Our  finding  suggests  that  a more  thorough  treat 
ment  of  nominal  rigidities,  possibly  through  state-dependent  pricing 
models,  may  yield  a high  payoff. 
We  want  to be  up  front  about  the  shortcomings  of  our  exercise.  First 
and  foremost,  we  face  the  limitations  of  the data. With  184 quarterly  ob 
servations  of  the U.S.  economy,  there  is a  tight  bound  on  how  much  we 
can  learn  from  the data  (Ploberger  and  Phillips  2003,  frame  the problem 
of  empirical  limits  for  time  series  models  precisely  in  terms  of  informa 
tion  bounds).  The  main  consequence  of  the  limitations  of  the  short 
sample  size  is relatively  imprecise  estimates. 
The  second  limitation,  forcefully  emphasized  by  Sims  (2001),  is  that 
we  do  not  allow  for  changing  volatilities  in the  innovations  of  the model, 
which  is  itself  a particular  form  of  parameter  drift.  If the  innovations  in 
the U.S.  data  are  heteroskedastic  (as we  report  in Fernandez-Villaverde 
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changing  variance  by  spurious  changes  in  the  structural  parameters.  At 
the  same  time,  Cogley  and  Sargent  (2005)  defend  that  there  is  still  vari 
ation  in  the parameters  of  a vector  autoregression  (VAR),  even  after  con 
trolling  for heteroskedasticity.  We  are  currently  working  on  an  exten 
sion  of  the model  with  both  parameter  drifting  and  changing  volatilities. 
We  build  upon  an  illustrious  tradition  of  estimating  models  with  pa 
rameter  drifting.  One  classic  reference  is Cooley  and  Prescott  (1976), 
where  the  authors  studied  the  estimation  of  regression  parameters  that 
are  subject  to permanent  and  transitory  shocks.  Unfortunately,  the  tech 
niques  in  this  tradition  are within  the  context  of  the  Cowles  Commis 
sion's  framework  and,  hence,  are  of  little  direct  application  to our  inves 
tigation. 
Our  paper  is also  linked  with  a growing  body  of  research  that  shows 
signs  of  parameter  drifting  on  dynamic  models.  Since  the  estimation  of 
this  class  of models  is a new  undertaking,  the  evidence  is scattered.  One 
relevant  literature  estimates  VARs  with  time-varying  parameters  and/ 
or  stochastic  volatility.  Examples  include  Uhlig  (1997),  Bernanke  and 
Mihov  (1998),  Cogley  and  Sargent  (2005),  Primiceri  (2005),  and  Sims  and 
Zha  (2006).  The  consensus  emerging  from  these  papers  is  that  there  is 
evidence  of  time  variation  in  the parameters  of  a VAR,  although  there  is 
a dispute  about  whether  the  variation  comes  from  changes  in  the  au 
toregressive  components  or  from  stochastic  volatility.  This  evidence, 
however,  is only  suggestive,  since  a DSGE  model  with  constant  param 
eters  may  be  compatible  with  a  time-varying  VAR  (Cogley  and  Sbor 
done  2006). 
A  second  group  of  studies  has  estimated  equilibrium  models  with  pa 
rameter  variation,  but  it has  been  less  ambitious  in  the  extent  of  the  fluc 
tuations  studied.  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  (2007)  and 
Justiniano  and  Primiceri  (2005)  demonstrate  the  importance  of  stochastic 
volatility  to account  for U.S.  data  using  a  DSGE  model.  King  (2006) works 
with  a simple  real business  cycle  (RBC)  economy  with  parameter  drift  in 
four  parameters.  However,  his  approach  relies  on  particular  properties 
of  his  model  and  it  is  too  cumbersome  to  be  of  general  applicability. 
Canova  (2005)  estimates  a  small-scale  New  Keynesian  model  with  pa 
rameter  drifting  but  without  the  agents  being  aware  of  these  changes  in 
the  parameters.  He  uncovers  important  movements  in  the  parameters 
that  enter  into  the  Phillips  curve  and  the  Euler  equations.  Boivin  (2006) 
estimates  a parameter-drifting  Taylor  rule with  real-time  data.  He  cor 
roborates  previous  findings  of  changes  in  the  rule  coefficients  obtained 
with  final  data.  Benati  (2006),  elaborating  on  an  argument  by Woodford How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  87 
(2006),  questions  the  indexation  mechanisms  introduced  in  New  Keyne 
sian models  and  shows  that  they  are  not  structural  to  changes  in  mone 
tary policy  rules.  Oliner,  Rudebusch,  and  Sichel  (1996)  find  unstable  pa 
rameters  even  investment  models  with  more  intricate  representations  of 
capital  spending  than  those  found  in current  DSGE  models.  Owyang  and 
Ramey  (2004)  estimate  regime-switching  models  of monetary  policy  and 
identify  the  evolving  preferences  of  the monetary  authority  through 
their  interaction  with  the  structural  parameters. 
There  are  also  numerous  papers  that  tell us  about  parameter  drifting, 
albeit  in an  indirect  way.  A  common  practice  when  estimating  models 
has  been  to divide  the  sample  into  two  periods,  usually  before  and  after 
1979,  and  argue  that  there  are  significant  differences  in  the  inference  re 
sults.  One  celebrated  representative  of  this method  is Clarida,  Gali,  and 
Gertler  (2000),  a paper  we  will  discuss  later. 
Finally,  a  literature  that  has  connections  with  our  analysis  is  the  one 
that  deals  with  DSGE  models  with  a  Markov-switching  process  in dif 
ferent  aspects  of  the  environment,  like monetary  or  fiscal  policy  (Davig 
and  Leeper  2006a  and  2006b,  Chung,  Davig,  and  Leeper  2006,  and 
Farmer,  Waggoner,  and  Zha  2006).  The  stated  motivation  of  these  papers 
is  that Markov  switches  help  us  understand  the  dynamics  of  the  econ 
omy  better.  So  far,  none  of  these  papers  has  produced  an  estimated 
model. 
The  rest  of  the  article  is organized  as  follows.  First,  in  section  2, we 
discuss  different  ways  to  think  about  parameter  drifting  in  dynamic 
equilibrium  models.  In  section  3, we  develop  two  simple  examples  of 
parameter  drift  that  motivate  our  investigation.  Section  4  defines  a 
medium-scale  model  of  the U.S.  economy  and  discusses  how  to  intro 
duce  this model  to  the data.  Section  5  introduces  parameter  drifting  and 
explains  how  to adapt  the  approach  in section  4  to handle  this  situation. 
We  report  our  results  in section  6. Section  7 concludes.  An  appendix  pro 
vides  the  interested  reader  with  technical  details. 
2  Parameter  Drifting  and  Dynamic  Equilibrium  Models 
There  are  at  least  three ways  to  think  about  parameter  drifting  in an  es 
timated  DSGE  model.  The  simplest  approach,  which  we  call  the  pure 
econometric  interpretation,  is  to  consider  parameter  drifting  as  a  conven 
ient  phenomenon  to  fit  the  data  better  or  as  the  consequence  of  a  capri 
cious  nature  that  agents  in  the model  neither  understand  nor  forecast. 
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expectations:  not  having  free  parameters  that  the  researcher  can  play 
with.  Consequently,  we  will  not  investigate  this  case  further. 
The  second  way  to  think  about  parameter  drifting  is as  a  characteris 
tic of  the  environment  that  the  agents  understand  and  act  upon.  Let  us 
come  back  to our  example  of  the  production  function.  Imagine  that  the 
aggregate  technology  is given  by  a Cobb-Douglas  function  Yt 
= 
AK? 
L,1_a',  where  output  Yt  is produced  with  capital  Kt  and  labor  Lt given  a 
technology  level  A  and  share  parameter  ar  The  only  difference  with  the 
standard  environment  is  that  at  is  indexed  by  time  (neither  the  realism 
nor  the  empirical  justification  of  our  example  is crucial  for  the  argument, 
although  we  could  argue  in  favor  of  both  features).  Let  us  also  assume 
that  at  evolves  over  time  as  a random  walk  with  reflecting  boundaries  at 
0 and  1,  to ensure  that  the  production  function  satisfies  the  usual  prop 
erties.  We  could  imagine  that  such  drift  comes  about  because  the  new 
technologies  developed  have  a  random  requirement  of  capital.  The  so 
lution  of  the  agents'  problems  are decision  rules  that have  as  one  of  their 
arguments  the  current  ar Why?  First,  because  at  determines  current 
prices.  Second,  because  at helps  to  forecast  future  values  at+j  and  hence 
to predict  future  prices.  This  interpretation  is our  favorite  one,  and  it  will 
frame  our  reading  of  the  results  in  section  6. 
The  final  perspective  about  parameter  drifting  is as  a  telltale  of model 
misspecification.  This  point,  raised  by  Cooley  (1971)  and  Rosenberg 
(1968),  is  particularly  cogent  when  estimating  DSGE  models.  These 
models  are  complex  constructions.  To make  them  useful  for policy  pur 
poses,  researchers  add many  mechanisms  that  affect  the dynamics  of  the 
economy:  sticky  prices  and wages,  adjustment  costs,  and  so  on.  In addi 
tion,  DSGE  models  require  right  parametric  assumptions  for  the  utility 
function,  production  function,  adjustment  costs,  distribution  of  shocks, 
and  so  forth.  If  we  seriously  misspecified  the model  along  at  least  one  di 
mension,  parameter  drifting  may  appear  as  the  only  possibility  left  to 
the model  to  fit  the  data.  Our  example  in  section  3  illustrates  this  point 
in detail.  We  will  exploit  this  possibility  in our  empirical  results  and  as 
sess  how  the  drift  in  the parameters  determining  the  degree  of nominal 
rigidity  in  the  economy  implies  that  time-dependent  models  of  pricing 
decisions  may  be  flawed. 
3  Two  Examples 
In this  section,  we  present  two  simple  examples  that  generate  parameter 
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lustrate  our  points  as  clearly  as  possible,  and  not  based  on  their  rele 
vance  or  plausibility.  However,  the  examples  are  not  far-fetched:  they 
deal  with  recurrent  themes  in  the  literature  and  are  linked  (albeit  we 
do  not  explore  this  connection  to  its  fullest)  to  relevant  features  of  the 
economy. 
3.1  Parameter  Drift  as  a Consequence  of Changing  Policies 
The  first  example  deals  with  the  changes  in  the  elasticity  of monetary 
policy  to different  variables.  It is common  to postulate  that  the monetary 
authority  uses  open  market  operations  to  set  the  short-run  nominal  in 
terest  rate Rt  according  to a Taylor  rule: 
Rt  (Rt-i\lR\(nt\Hy^1-^  / 
7f-hr)l(n)(?)J 
"<*?  > 
The  variable  II represents  the  target  levels  of  inflation  of  the monetary 
authority,  R  the  steady-state  gross  return  of  capital,  yt  is output,  and  yt a 
measure  of  target  output.  The  term  emt is a  random  shock  distributed  ac 
cording  to Jf(0,1). 
In  an  influential  contribution,  Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler  (2000)  at 
tracted  the  attention  of  economists  to changes  in the  elasticity  parameter 
7n before  and  after Volcker's  appointment  as Fed  chairman  in 1979.  They 
document,  with  a  slightly  different  specification  of  the Taylor  rule,  that 
7n more  than  doubles  after  1979.  This  finding  has  been  corroborated  in 
many  studies  and  found  resilient  to  modifications  in  the  empirical  spec 
ification  (Lubick  and  Schorfheide  2004).  The  division  of  the  sample  be 
tween  the  time  before  and  after  1979  has  also  been  exploited  by  Boivin 
and  Giannoni  (2006), who  find  that  the  point  estimates  of  the  structural 
parameters  also  substantially  vary  between  the  two  periods. 
Changes  in  the  policy  coefficients  are  one  particular  example  of  pa 
rameter  drift.  They  can  be  the  consequence  of  the  shifting  priorities  of 
the policymakers  or,  as  emphasized  by  Sargent  (1999),  of  changes  in  the 
perception  of  the  effectiveness  of monetary  policy.  Once  we  recognize 
that  there  is evidence  of  the parameter  7n  drifting  over  time,  it is natural 
to assume  that  agents  are  aware  of  the  changes  and  act upon  them.  Such 
an  environment  may  capture  some  of  the  insights  of  Sims  (1980)  about 
the  difference  between  a  change  in policy  regime  (in our  Taylor  rule,  a 
change  in  the way  the  interest  rate  is determined)  and  the  evolution  of 
the policy  within  one  regime,  which  could  be  represented  in our  context 
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3.2  Parameter  Drift  as  a Telltale  of  Model  Misspecification 
Our  second  example  revisits  several  of  the  themes  in Browning,  Hansen, 
and  Heckman  (1999). We  explore  the  consequences  for  inference  of  an 
econometrician  estimating  a model  with  infinitely  lived  agents  when 
the  data  are  actually  generated  by  an  overlapping-generations  model. 
We  show  how  our  estimate  of  the discount  factor will  be  a function  of  the 
true  discount  factor,  the  elasticity  of  output  to capital,  and  the  changing 
age  distribution  of  the  population.  This  example  is  relevant  because 
variations  in  the  age  structure  of  the U.S.  population  have  been  contin 
uous  due  to  shifts  in  fertility  and mortality. 
3.2.1  An  Artificial  World  We  begin  by  creating  a  simple  artificial 
world.  In each  period  t, there  are  two  generations  of  households  alive, 
young  and  old.  Each  household  maximizes  the  life utility 
logc;  +  pE,logc;+1 
where  the  superindex  denotes  that  the household  was  born  in period  t, 
the  subindex  the  period  in which  it consumes,  and  Et is  the  conditional 
expectations  operator.  The  discount  factor,  p,  captures  the preference  for 
current  consumption.  We  pick  a  log utility  function  to  simplify  the  alge 
bra  that  follows. 
Households  work  when  young  and  get  a wage  wt  for  a unit  of  time 
that  they  supply  inelastically.  Households  live  off  their  savings  when 
they  are  old.  The  period  budget  constraints  are  c\ +  st 
= 
wt  and  c\+1 
= 
Rt+1st,  where  st  is  the  household  savings  and  Rt+1  the  gross  return  on  cap 
ital.  From  the  first  order  condition  of  households,  we  have  that  c\ 
= 
[1/(1  + P)H  and c\ 
=  [0/(1 +  p)]wr 
In each  period,  a number  nt of  new  households  is born.  For  the mo 
ment,  we  will  assume  only  that  lt is the  realization  of  some  random  pro 
cess.  Nothing  of  substance  for our  argument  is  lost by  assuming  that  the 
size  of  the new  generation  is exogenous. 
The  production  side  of  the  economy  is defined  by  a Cobb-Douglas 
function,  yt 
= 
k^l)-*, where  kt  is  the  total  amount  of  capital  in  the  econ 
omy  and  lt the  total  amount  of  labor.  If  we  assume  total  depreciation  in 
the  economy,  again  to  simplify  the  algebra,  and  impose  the  condition  lt 
= 




a)/^/"-"  and  Rt 
= 
afcj^n  J-". 
All  that  remains  is  some  accounting.  Total  consumption  in  the  econ 
omy  in period  t, Ct,  is equal  to  the  consumption  of  the  old  generation 
plus  the  consumption  of  the  young  generation.  The  old  consume  all  of How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  91 
their  income,  which  is equal  to  the  capital  income  of  the  economy,  Rtkt 
= 
akfn]-".  The  young  consume  a  fraction  [1/(1  +  P)]  of  their  income, 





Then  total  consumption  is: 
1 + a(3 
'  1 +  (3 
*  l 
By  the  aggregate  resource  constraint,  investment  (or, equivalently,  cap 




t  =  k  =  -_?r  L<  t+1  1 + a(3 
Lt 
Finally,  we  find  per  capita  consumption  cvtc  as: 
Q 
CPC  =  -i  * 
nt +  *t-i 
3.2.2  An  Econometrician  Let  us  now  suppose  that  we  have  an 
econometrician  who  aims  to estimate  a  model  with  a  representative  in 
finitely  lived  agent  and  T observations  generated  from  our  economy.  To 
do  so,  the  econometrician  postulates  that  the  agent  has  a utility  function: 
?  r  t 
maxE,?p*  11(1+7*)  logcf 
where  yt  is  the  (random)  growth  rate  of  the population  between  periods 
t -1  and  t: 
nt  + 
nt_x 
1  +  7 
= 
nt-l  +  nt-2 
and  70 
=  0. This  utility  function  is the  same  as  in  the  canonical  presenta 
tion  of  the  RBC  model  in Cooley  and  Prescott  (1995)  except  that  the 
growth  rate  of  the population  is stochastic  instead  of  constant.  The  pro 
duction  side  of  the  economy  is  the  same  as before,  yt 
= 
k^l]~a. Thus,  the 
only  difference  between  the  artificial  world  we  have  created  and  the 
model  the  econometrician  estimates  is  that,  instead  of  having  two  gen 
erations  alive  in  each  moment,  the  econometrician  estimates  a model 
with  a  representative  agent. 
What  are  the  consequences  on  the  estimated  parameters?  Imagine 
that  the  econometrician  knows  a  and  that  the  depreciation  factor  is  1. 
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TU^r  W W+i 
and  substitute  the  expectation  by  the  sample  mean: 
_Vr-i_ 
.  _  r-i  z"-? 
&tc  Pt~  i  ;  r^7 
We  study  how  this  expression  evolves  over  time.  First,  note  that,  by 
substituting  the  expressions  found  before,  we  get: 
a+  )  R>^  -  (n'+i+  n')2  a  1  + p  1 
7l+1 
c?+l  nt +  nt_x  1-a  3  C( 
Then: 
.  !_a  i  Ia(?.  + 
^  3r 
= 
3-~  a  1 +  3 
yT_1("t+l 
+  ",)2  1 
We  want  to work  on  the previous  expression.  First,  we  substitute  ag 
gregate  consumption  for  its value  in  terms  of  capital  and  labor: 
Vt-i 
1 
1  1-a  ^"o^^^-^fc^p 
BT 
=  B-??  T  1 +  P  ex  (nt+1  +  ntf  1 
^t==0 
nt +nf_1  fcfnj"a 
The  only  remaining  endogenous  element  in  this  equation  is kt. To  elimi 
nate  it,  we  recursively  substitute  kt_{ to  find: 
T(l-a)p  '"VCL-cOP  VI 
Then: 
Vt  nt+nt_l  IT  _  /(l-a)P  Wl  1-a 
1  1-a  ^"^Fin?_T  A  1  + *p  <T_7  PI  o  =o-i-y=-\-f_j.?i  HT 
Kl+p  a  _  (nt+,  + n)2  IT  ?  /(l-a)p  UI  V? 
^=0  (n,  + 
n,_1)nJ-alL 
'_1 
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which  delivers  a PT,  which  is biased  and  drifts  over  time  according  to  the 
evolution  of  the population.  This  expression  is composed  of  three  parts. 
First,  the  true  parameter,  p,  second  the  deterministic  bias, 
1  1 -a 
1 +  P  a 
and  finally  the  term  involving  the  nts  and  kQ,  which  fluctuates  over  time. 
Without  further  structure  on  population  growth  over  time,  it  is diffi 
cult  to  say much  about  PT.  In  the  simple  case where  yt 
= 
7  is constant,  as 
T ?>  00, the  only  factor  dominating  is: 
Pr-P-r^-1?^d+7)-2  (1)  1 +  P  a 
To  explore  the  behavior  of  PT in  the  general  case  where  7,  varies,  we 
simulate  the model  and  estimate  the  parameter  recursively  with  data 
from  an  economy  with  a  =  0.3  and  p 
=  0.96.  The  growth  rates  of  popu 
lation  are  2,4,3,1,2,  and  5 percent  each  for  50 periods  (i.e.,  for period  1 
to 50,  growth  rate  is 2 percent,  for period  51  to  100,  the  growth  rate  is 4 
percent  and  so  forth). We  plot  our  results  in  figure  2.1, where  we  see  the 
evolution  over  time  of  PT and  how  it  inherits  the properties  of  yt. To  fa 
cilitate  comparison  with  (1),  we  superimpose  the value  of  (1) that would 
1.14i-.-1-.-  i 
|  -Estimate  of  p 
-Long-run  Limit 
1.12-  r-11-' 
1.1=_, 
j  L-, 
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Figure  2.1 
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be  implied  if the  growth  rate  in a period  stayed  constant  over  time.  The 
graph  shows  how  PT converges  to  (1)  within  each  block  of  50 periods. 
4  The  Baseline  Model 
We  will  structure  our  investigation  around  a baseline  New  Keynesian 
business  cycle  model.  We  pick  this model  because  it is the paradigmatic 
representative  of  the DSGE  economies  estimated  by  practitioners.  Since 
(Fernandez-Villaverde  2005)  we  have  gone  on  the  record  on  other  occa 
sions,  criticizing  the problems  of  this  framework,  we  do  not  feel  obliged 
to  repeat  those  shortcomings  here.  Suffice  it to  say  as  a  motivation  that 
given  the  level  of  interest  by  policymaking  institutions  in  this model,  it 
is difficult  to  see  a  more  appropriate  vessel  for  our  exploration. 
The  New  Keynesian  model  is well  known  (see  the  book-length  de 
scription  in  Woodford  2003).  Consequently,  we  will  be  brief  in our  pres 
entation  and will  omit  some  of  the  technical  aspects.  On  the  other  hand, 
for  concreteness,  we  need  to discuss  the model  at  a  certain  level  of  de 
tail. The  interested  reader  can  access  the  entire  description  of  the model 
at  a  complementary  technical  appendix  posted  at www.econ.upenri 
.edu/~jesusfv/benchmark_DSGE.pdf.  In  this  section,  to  clarify  our 
ideas,  we  will  introduce  the model  without  changes  in  the  parameters. 
In  section  5, we  will  introduce  the  parameter  change  over  time. 
4.1  Households 
The  basic  structure  of  the  economy  is as  follows.  A  representative  house 
hold  consumes,  saves,  holds  real money  balances,  supplies  labor,  and 
sets  its own  wages  subject  to  a demand  curve  and  Calvo's  pricing.  The 
final  output  is manufactured  by  a  competitive  final-good  producer, 
which  uses  as  inputs  a continuum  of  intermediate  goods  manufactured 
by  monopolistic  competitors.  The  intermediate-good  producers  rent 
capital  and  labor  to manufacture  their  good.  Also,  the  intermediate 
good  producers  face  the  constraint  that  they  can  only  change  prices  fol 
lowing  a Calvo's  rule.  Finally,  there  is a  monetary  authority  that  fixes  the 
one-period  nominal  interest  rate  through  open  market  operations  with 
public  debt.  Long-run  growth  is  induced  by  the  presence  of  two  unit 
roots,  one  in  the  level  of  neutral  technology  and  one  in  the  investment 
specific  technology.  These  stochastic  trends  will  allow  us  to estimate  the 
model  with  the  raw,  undetrended  data. 
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households  maximize  the  following  lifetime  utility  function,  which  is 
separable  in  consumption,  cjt,  real money  balances,  mjt/pt, 
and  hours 
worked,  ljt: 
h Z  P'd, tog(c;, 
- 
hcjt_,) 




where  P  is  the  discount  factor,  h  controls  habit  persistence,  %  is  the  in 
verse  of  Frisch  labor  supply  elasticity,  dt is a  shock  to  intertemporal  pref 
erence  with  the  law  of motion: 
log  dt 
= 
pd log  dt_t  +  (jdedrt  where  zdJt 
~ 
Jt(0,1), 
and  <pt  is a  labor  supply  shock  with  the  law  of motion: 
tog  ft 
= 
P9  tog  cp,_i  +  <W  where  e9#, 
~  >f (0,1). 
Households  trade  on  the whole  set  of Arrow-Debreu  securities,  con 
tingent  on  idiosyncratic  and  aggregate  events.  Our  notation  a.t+1  indi 
cates  the  amount  of  those  securities  that pay  one  unit  of  consumption  in 
event 
wjt+lt  purchased  by  household/  at  time  t at  (real)  price  qjt+u.  To 
save  on  notation,  we  drop  the  explicit  dependence  on  the  event.  House 
holds  also  hold  an  amount,  bjt, 
of  government  bonds  that pay  a nominal 
gross  interest  rate  of Rt  and  invest  xt. Then,  the/ 
-  th household's  budget 
constraint  is: 
mit  K+i  c 







+  ~  +  Rt-i-^  + 
fy 
+  Tt +  Ff 
where  z^  is  the  real wage,  rt the  real  rental  price  of  capital,  ujt 
>  0  the  in 
tensity  of  use  of  capital,  \L~l<l>(ujt) 
is  the  physical  cost  of  ujt  in  resource 
terms,  |n, is an  investment-specific  technological  shock  (to be  described 
momentarily),  Tt  is a  lump-sum  transfer,  and  F, is  the profits  of  the  firms 
in  the  economy.  We  assume  that  <J>(1) 
= 
0,  <&'  and  <?>"  >  0. 
Investment  xjt induces  a  law  of motion  for  capital: 
*, 
= 
(l-8)Vi  + * 
1~V(-^A 
xj* 
where  8  is  the  depreciation  rate  and  V(-)  is a quadratic  adjustment  cost 
function  such  that V(AX) 
= 
0, where  Ax  is  the  growth  rate  of  investment 
along  the balance  growth  path.  Note  that we  index  capital  by  the  time  its 96  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
level  is decided.  The  investment-specific  technological  shock  follows  an 
autoregressive  process: 
jl, 
= 
fVi  exP(\ 
+ 
zM) where  zM 
= 
a^  and  ?M 
- 
X(0,1) 
The  first  order  conditions  with  respect  to  cjt, bjt, ujt, kjt, 


















8Hm  +  r?+iVi 
~ 
Cw.%)]  L and 
L  \ *;t-l  /  \ Xjt-l  /  Xjt-1 J 
where  A.., is  the  Lagrangian  multiplier  associated  with  the  budget  con 
straint  and  qjt is  the marginal  Tobin's  Q,  the Lagrangian  multiplier  asso 
ciated  with  the  investment  adjustment  constraint  normalized  by  \jt. 
The  first  order  condition  with  respect  to  labor  and wages  is  more  in 
volved.  The  labor  employed  by  intermediate-good  producers  is  sup 
plied  by  a  representative,  competitive  firm  that hires  the  labor  supplied 
by  each  household/.  The  labor  supplier  aggregates  the differentiated  la 
bor  of households  with  the production  function: 
l*  = 
\\^-^dj\ 
,  (2) 
where  y\ controls  the  elasticity  of  substitution  among  different  types  of 
labor  and  ldt  is  the  aggregate  labor  demand. 
The  labor  "packer"  maximizes  profits  subject  to  the  production  func 
tion  (2),  taking  as  given  all  differentiated  labor wages  wjt  and  the wage 
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Then,  to  find  the  aggregated  wage,  we  again  use  the  zero  profit  condi 
tion wtldt 
= 
IJ  wjtljtdj 
to deliver: 
(A  \i/(i-m) 
wt  = 
^  wjr^djj 
Households  set  their  wages  following  a Calvo's  setting.  In  each  pe 
riod,  a  fraction  1 - 
6W  of  households  reoptimize  their wages.  All  other 
households  can  only  partially  index  their  wages  by  past  inflation.  In 
dexation  is controlled  by  the  parameter  \w  e  (0,1).  This  implies  that  if 
the household  cannot  change  its  wage  for t periods,  its normalized  wage 
after  t periods  is nj=1(n**^y  n,+s)w;;.f. 
Since  we  assume  complete  markets  and  separable  utility  in  labor  (see 
Erceg,  Henderson,  and  Levin,  2000),  we  will  concentrate  on  a  symmet 
ric  equilibrium  where  c-t 
= 
ct,  ujt 
= 
ut,  kjt_x 
? 
kt,  xjt 
= 
xt,  Xjt 
= 
Xt,  qjt 
= 
qt, 
and  w*t 
=  w*.  In anticipation  of  that  equilibrium,  and  after  a  fair  amount 
of manipulation,  we  arrive  at  the  recursive  equations: 
n  -  1  /  11*- \!-JW*  \ri-l 
and: 
that  determine  the  evolution  of wages. 
Then,  in  every  period,  a  fraction  1 - 
dw of  households  set wf  as  their 
wage,  while  the  remaining  fraction  dw  partially  index  their  price  by  past 
inflation.  Consequently,  the  real wage  index  evolves: 
4.2  The  Final-Good  Producer 
There  is one  final  good  produced  using  intermediate  goods  with  the  fol 
lowing  production  function: 
(A  \e/(e-l) 
(ytmdi\ 
,  (4) 
where  e controls  the  elasticity  of  substitution. 
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subject  to  the  production  function  (4),  taking  as  given  all  intermediate 
goods'  prices  pit and  the  final  good  price  pr Repeating  the  same  steps  as 
for wages,  we  obtain  the  demand  functions  for  each  intermediate  good: 
where  ydt is  the  aggregate  demand  and  the  zero  profit  condition  ptydt 
= 
\\pityitdi  to deliver: 




4.3  Intermediate-Good  Producers 
There  is a  continuum  of  intermediate-good  producers.  Each  intermedi 
ate-good  producer  i has  access  to  a  technology  represented  by  a pro 
duction  function: 
where  kit_x is  the  capital  rented  by  the  firm,  ldit  is  the  amount  of  the 
"packed"  labor  input  rented  by  the  firm,  the  parameter  <J>  corresponds 
to  the  fixed  cost  of production,  and where  At  follows: 
At 
= 
At_x  exp(A^ 
+ 
zAt)  wherezAtt 
= 
vAzAt  and  eAt 
~ 
Jt(0,1). 
The  fixed  cost  <f>  is  scaled  by  the  variable  zt 
= 
A]/{1~<l)iL<?/il~a).  We  can 
think  of  zt as  a weighted  index  of  the  two  technology  levels  At  and  jx,, 
where  the weight  is  the  share  of  capital  in  the  production  function.  The 
product  4>z, guarantees  that  economic  profits  are  roughly  equal  to zero 
in  the  steady  state.  Also,  we  rule  out  the  entry  and  exit  of  intermediate 
good  producers.  Note  that  zt evolves  over  time  as  zt 
= 
zM  exp(A2  +  zzt) 





a)  and  A2 
= 
(AA +  aA J/(l 
- 
a). We  will  see 
in  the  following  that Az  is  the mean  growth  rate  of  the  economy. 
Intermediate-good  producers  solve  a  two-stage  problem.  First,  given 
wt  and  rt, they  rent  ldt  and  kit_x in perfectly  competitive  factor markets  in 
order  to  minimize  real  costs,  which  implies  a  marginal  cost  of: 
The  marginal  cost  does  not  depend  on  i: all  firms  receive  the  same 
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Second,  intermediate-good  producers  choose  the  price  that  maxi 
mizes  discounted  real  profits  under  the  same  pricing  scheme  as house 
holds.  In each  period,  a fraction  1 - 
dp 
of  firms  reoptimize  their  prices.  All 
other  firms  can  only  index  their  prices  by  past  inflation.  Indexation  is 
controlled  by  the parameter  x  g  (0,1),  where  x 
=  0  is no  indexation  and 
X 
=  1  is  total  indexation. 
The  problem  of  the  firms  is  then: 
max 
Etjr(pe,)^[(ri  ^s-A~ 
~ 
mct+\ytt+r  Pit  T=0  \  |_W  Pt  +  T  ) 
subject  to 
\S 
=  1  Pt  + T/ 
where  the marginal  value  of  a dollar  to  the  household  is  treated  as  ex 
ogenous  by  the  firm.  Since  there  are  complete  markets  in securities,  this 
marginal  value  is constant  across  households  and,  consequently,  Xt+r/\ 
is  the  correct  valuation  on  future  profits. 
We  write  the  solution  of  the problem  in  terms  of  two  recursive  equa 
tions  in g)  and  g2: 
g) = \mctyd + ped 
j^-  J 
g]+1 




l)g2  and  n*  = 
pf/pr 
Given  Calvo's  pricing,  the price  index  evolves: 
pxr 
= 
%(^uy~zp)-i  +  (i 
- 
%)pr~e 
or,  dividing  by  p]~e, 
1=9'(ir)  +o-vn 
4.4  The  Government 
The  government  sets  the nominal  interest  rates  according  to  the  Taylor 
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yd 
r -(-rj  L(nj  lv/  J 
exp<''  <5) 
through  open  market  operations  that  are  financed  with  lump-sum 
transfers  Tt to ensure  that  the  government  budget  is balanced  period  by 
period.  The  variable  II  represents  the  target  levels  of  inflation  (equal  to 
inflation  in  the  steady  state),  R  is the  steady-state  gross  return  of  capital, 
and 
Kyd 
the  steady-state  gross  growth  rate  of  ydt.  With  a bit  of  abuse  of 
language,  we  will  refer  to  the  term 
(yd/yd_^/Ayd 
as  the growth  gap.  The 
term  mt  is a  random  shock  to monetary  policy  that  follows  mt 
= 
cimemt 
where  emt is distributed  according  to N(0,1).  We  introduce  the previous 
period  interest  rate,  Rt,  to match  the  smooth  profile  of  the  interest  rate 
over  time  observed  in  the United  States. 
4.5  Aggregation 
First,  we  begin  with  the  aggregate  demand: 
yf 
= 
ct +  xt +  p.,"1  *(uf)fc,_r 
Then,  using  the  production  function  for  intermediate-good  producers, 
the  fact  that  all  the  firms  pick  the  same  capital-labor  ratio,  and  market 
clearing  in the  output  and  input markets,  we  find  the  aggregate  demand 





is  the  aggregate  loss  of  efficiency  induced  by  price  dispersion.  By  the 




+  (i-e;)nr. 
Finally,  we  integrate  labor  demand  over  all households;  to obtain: 
!>-w:(^)>?. 
where  lt is the  aggregate  labor  supply  of households.  Hence  if  we  define How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  101 
we  get: 
and: 
(W,  , njs  \-n 
if  if") 
vr-i  + a  - 
ej(nr*)-" 
4.6  Equilibrium 
A  definition  of  equilibrium  in  this  economy  is  standard  and  the  equa 
tions  that  characterize  it are  determined  by  the  first  order  conditions  of 
the household,  the  first  order  conditions  of  the  firms,  the Taylor  rule  of 
the  government,  and market  clearing. 
To  undertake  our  quantitative  analysis,  we  must  approximate  the 
equilibrium  dynamics  of  the  economy.  Ours  is  a  large  model  (even 
the  version  without  parameter  drifting  has  19  state  variables).  More 
over,  we  will  need  to  solve  the model  repeatedly  during  our  estimation 
process.  We  have  argued  elsewhere  (Fernandez-Villaverde,  Rubio 
Ramirez,  and  Santos  2006)  that  there  is  much  to be  gained  from  a non 
linear  estimation  of  the model,  both  in  terms  of  accuracy  and  in  terms  of 
identification.  This  is particularly  true  if  we  want  to allow  the  agents  in 
the  economy  to ensure  themselves  against  future  changes  in  the param 
eters  of  the model.  Hence,  we  require  a nonlinear  solution  method  that 
is  fast  and  accurate.  In previous  work  (Aruoba,  Fernandez-Villaverde, 
and  Rubio-Ramirez  2006),  we  have  found  that  a  second  order  perturba 
tion  around  the  deterministic  steady  state  of  the model  fulfills  the  pre 
vious  desiderata. 
But  before  solving  the model,  we  clear  up  some  technical  issues.  First, 
because  of  technological  change,  most  of  the  variables  are  growing  in 
average.  To  achieve  the  right  accuracy  in  the  computation,  we  make  the 
variables  stationary  and  solve  the model  in  the  transformed  variables. 
Hence,  we  define  ct 
= 
ct/zt,  Xt 
= 
Xtzt,  ft 
= 
rt\x,t,  qt 
= 
qt\xt,  xt 
= 
xjzt,  wt 
= 
wjzt,  wf 
= 
w*/zt,  kt 
= 
kt/zt\it,  and  yd 
= 










A2.  Second,  we  choose  functional  forms  for $(  ) and 




1) +  (02/2)(w 
- 
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u  =  1  in  the  steady  state.  Hence,  f  = 
<S>'(1) 
= 
^  and  O(l) 
=  0. The  in 
vestment  adjustment  cost  function  is V(xt/xt_1) 
= 
(K/2)[(xt/xt_1) 
-  A J2. 
Then,  along  the balanced  growth  path,  V(AX) 
= 
V'(AX) 
=  0. 
We  will  perform  our  perturbation  in  logs.  For  each  variable  vart, we 
define  vart 
= 
log  vart 
- 
log  var,  as  the  log  deviation  with  respect  to  the 
steady  state.  Then,  the  states  of  the model  St are  given  by: 
(iit_v  jbx_v g)_v  g2t_v kt_v At_v  pu,  et_v  v*_v  vtv  \'  f  = 
U  i  a  a  ft  a 
\\t-VJl-V  Xt-V  A-t-1'  ^t-V  2M-1;  ^t-V  $t-V  ZA,t-l  J 
and  the  exogenous  shocks  are  et 
= 
(e^,  zdt,  e^t,  zAt,  ?mt).' 
As  a  first  step, we  parameterize  the matrix  of variances-covariances  of 
the  exogenous  shocks  as  fl(x) 
= 
x^X where  ft(l) 
=  Cl  is a diagonal  ma 
trix.  However,  nothing  really  depends  on  that  assumption,  and  we 
could  handle  an  arbitrary  matrix  of  variances-covariances.  Then,  we 
take  a perturbation  solution  around  the deterministic  steady  state  of  the 
model,  that  is, x 
-  0. 
From  the  output  of  the  perturbation,  we  build  the  law  of motion  for 
the  states: 
st+1 
= 
*js;,  e;y + 
\(sft, 
z't)%2(s\,  e;y + *s3,  (6) 
where  %  is a  1 X  24 vector  and %  is a 24  X  24 matrix.  Theterm  %(S't, 
e[)f  constitutes  the  linear  solution  of  the model,  (S't, zft)%2(Sft, eft)r is  the 
quadratic  component,  and  ^s3  is a  1 X  24  vector  of  constants  added  by 
the  second  order  approximation  that  corrects  for precautionary  behav 
ior. Some  of  the  entries  of  the matrices  %  will  be  zero. 
From  the  same  output,  we  find  the  law  of motion  for  the  observables 
W  = 
(A log ^\  A  log  yt, A  log  lt, log n?  log R,)'. 
Now,  define  St 
= 
(S't, S't_x,  e^).  We  keep  track  of  the  past  states,  S't_u be 
cause  some  of  the  observables  in  the  following  measurement  equation 
will  appear  in  first  differences.  Then,  we  write  to  the  observation  equa 
tion: 
^T = 
W,  e;y 
+1 
(s;, e't)%2(S't,  e;y + *o3  (7) 
where  V0l  and  ^o3l  X  48  vectors  and %2  is a 48  X  48 matrix. 
While  the  law  of motion  for  states  is unique  (or at  least  equivalent  to 
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dynamics  of  the model),  the  observation  equation  depends  on what  we 
assume  the  researcher  actually  observes.  In our  case, we  have  chosen  the 
first  differences  of  the  relative  price  of  investment,  output,  hours,  infla 
tion,  and  the  federal  funds  rate. Unfortunately,  we  do  not  know  much 
about  the  right  choice  of  observables  and  how  they may  affect  our  esti 
mation  results  (for  one  of  the  few  articles  on  this  topic,  see  Boivin  and 
Giannoni  2006). 
4.7  The  Likelihood  Function 
Equations  (6)  and  (7)  constitute  the  state  space  representation  of  our 
model.  One  convenient  property  of  this  representation  is that we  can  ex 
ploit  it  to evaluate  the  likelihood  of  a DSGE  model,  an  otherwise  chal 
lenging  task.  The  likelihood,  ??(  YT;  ^P), is  the probability  that  the model 
assigns  to a  sequence  of  realizations  of  the  observable  YT  given  param 
eter  values: 
^  = 
(P, h, v, #,  8,  x\, e, a,  <(>,  0W,  Xw, %,  XP, $2/  7r/ V  7n> n/K*  Aa/  ft*/ ftp/ 
Note  that 0:  is not  included  in  W  because  it is a  function  of  the  other  pa 
rameters  in  the  economy  to  ensure  that  f  = 
4>r  With  ??(  YT; ty),  we  can 
estimate  W  by maximizing  the  likelihood  or by  combining  it  with  a prior 
density  for  the model  parameter  to  form  a posterior  distribution. 
How  do  we  evaluate  the  likelihood  !?(YT;  \P)? Given  the Markov 
structure  of  our  state  space  representation,  we  begin  by  factorizing  the 
likelihood  function  as: 
T 
?{YT; V)  = 
J] ^(Vr  IY'-1;  ?). 
t=i 
Then,  conditioning  on  the  states: 
?(YT;  ?)  = 
/  X(YX  |  S0;  V)dS0  U  /  2(Vt  I  Sf;  V)p(St |  V1;  V)dSt  (8) 
li we  know  St,  computing  ?(Yt  I  St;  Mf) is  relatively  easy.  Conditional 
on  St,  the measurement  equation  (7)  is a  change  of  variables  from  et  to 
W.  Hence,  we  can  apply  the  change-of-variable  formula  to evaluate  the 
required  probabilities.  Similarly,  if  we  know  S0,  we  can  employ  (6) and 
the measurement  equation  (7)  to  compute  S?(Yt  |  S0; ty).  Consequently, 
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find  i?(YT; ^).  Evaluating  (or at  least  drawing  from)  p(S0> ^)  is usually 
straightforward,  although  often  costly  (Santos  and  Peralta-Alva  2005). 
The  difficulty  is to characterize  the  sequence  of  conditional  distributions 
[p(St  |  Y'-1; V)]J=1  and  to compute  the  integrals  in  (8). 
An  algorithm  for doing  so  (but not  the  only  one;  see  the  technical  ap 
pendix  to  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  2007,  for  alterna 
tives  and  references)  is  to use  a  simulation  technique  known  as  the  par 
ticle filter.  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  (2005  and  2007) 
have  shown  that  the particle  filter  can  be  successfully  applied  to  the  es 
timation  of nonlinear  and/or  nonnormal  DSGE  models.  The  particle  fil 
ter  is  a  sequential  Monte  Carlo  method  that  replaces  the  [p(SjY'_1; 
W)]J=1  by  an  empirical  distribution  of  draws  generated  by  simulation. 
The  bit  of magic  in  the  particle  filter  is  that  the  simulation  is generated 
through  a procedure  known  as  sequential  importance  resampling  (SIR). 
Sequential  importance  resampling  guarantees  that  the Monte  Carlo 
method  achieves  sufficient  accuracy  in  a  reasonable  amount  of  time, 
something  that  cannot  be  achieved  without  resampling  (Arulampalam, 
Maskell,  Gordon,  and  Clapp  2002).  The  appendix  describes  in  further 
detail  the working  of  the particle  filter. 
4.8  A  Bayesian  Approach 
We  will  confront  our model  with  the  data  using  Bayesian  methods.  The 
Bayesian  paradigm  is a powerful  and  flexible  perspective  for  the  esti 
mation  of DSGE  models  (see  the  survey  by  An  and  Schorfheide  2006). 
First,  Bayesian  analysis  is a  coherent  approach  to  inference  based  on  a 
clear  set  of  axioms.  Second,  the Bayesian  approach  handles  in a natural 
way  misspecification  and  lack  of  identification,  both  serious  concerns  in 
the  estimation  of DSGE  models  (Canova  and  Sala  2006). Moreover,  it  has 
desirable  small-sample  and  asymptotic  properties,  even  when  evalu 
ated  by  classical  criteria  (Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
2004).  Third,  priors  are  a flexible  procedure  to  introduce  presample  in 
formation  and  to reduce  the dimensionality  problem  associated  with  the 
number  of parameters.  This  property  will  be  especially  attractive  in our 
application,  since  parameter  drifting  will  increase  the practical  number 
of  dimensions  of  our model. 
The  Bayesian  approach  combines  the  likelihood  of  the model  ??(YT;  W) 
with  a prior  density  for  the parameters  p(^)  to  form  a posterior 
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The  posterior  summarizes  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  parameters, 
and  it can  be  used  for point  estimation.  For  example,  under  a quadratic 
loss  function,  our  point  estimates  will  be  the mean  of  the posterior. 
Since  the posterior  is also  difficult  to characterize,  we  generate  draws 
from  it using  a Metropolis-Hastings  algorithm.  We  use  the  resulting 
empirical  distribution  to  obtain  point  estimates,  variances,  and  so  on. 
We  describe  this  algorithm  in  the  appendix. 
5  Parameter  Drifting 
Now  we  are  ready  to deal  with  parameter  drifting.  Since  the  extension 
to other  cases  of  parameter  variation  is rather  straightforward,  we  pres 
ent  only  one  example  of  drift  within  our model. 
Motivated  by  the  first  example  in section  3, we  will  investigate  the  sit 
uation  where  the Taylor  rule  is specified  as: 
t'[-t)  Un)  UJ  J 
exp(w,)-  (9) 
Note  the difference  with  the  specification  in  (5):  in  the new  equation  the 
elasticities  of  the  response  of  the  interest  rate  (yRt, ym,  7  t)  are  indexed  by 
time. 
We  will  postulate  that  the parameters  follow  an  autoregressive  model 
(AR[1])  in  logs  to ensure  that  the parameter  is positive: 




pR)log  7^ +  pK log  7^  +  eRt, 0]  (10) 
tog  7ro 
= 
(1~  Pn)  log  7n  +  Pn  log  7m-i  +  em  (U) 




py)  log  yy 
+ 
Py  tog  yyt_, 
+ 
Eyt (12) 
where  [zRt,  Ent, eyJ 
are  i.i.d.  normal  shocks  and  Q  is a 3 X  3  matrix  of  co 
variances.2  We  allow  for  arbitrary  correlation  in  the  innovations,  since  it 
is plausible  that  the  reasons  why  the monetary  authority  becomes  more 
(less)  responsive  to  inflation  are  the  same  reasons  it  will  become  less 
(more)  responsive  to  the  growth  gap.  Also,  we  could  generalize  the 
changes  in parameters  by  allowing  changes  in II or  in  the variance  of mt 
(R and 
Kyd 
are  not  chosen  by  the monetary  authority  but  they  are  im 
plied  by  the other  parameters  of  the model  and  by  II). Finally,  we  impose 
the  stability  condition  that  the  smoothing  coefficient  yRt  must  be  less 
than  1 in  levels  (or  less  than  0  in  logs). 
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change  process,  in opposition  to  the  discrete  changes  in  the parameters 
captured  by  a  Markov-switching  process  (see Davig  and  Leeper  2006a 
and  2006b).  We  do  not  have  a  strong  prior  preference  for one  version  or 
the  other.  We  prefer  our  specification  because  it  is parsimonious  and 
easy  to handle,  and  it captures  phenomena  such  as  the  Fed's  gradual 
learning  about  the behavior  of  the  economy. 
According  to our  favorite  interpretation  of  parameter  drifting,  we  will 
assume  that  agents  understand  that  policy  evolves  over  time  following 
equations  (10)-(12).  Consequently,  they  react  to  it and make  their decisions 
based  on  the current  values  of yt and  on  the  fact  that yt  will  evolve  over  time. 
The  drift  of  the  parameters  implies  that  the  economy  will  travel 
through  zones  where  the Taylor  principle  is not  satisfied.  However,  this 
may  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  equilibrium  is not  unique.  In  the  con 
text  of Markov-regime  changes  in  the  coefficients  of  the  Taylor  rule, 
Davig  and  Leeper  (2006b)  have  developed  what  they  call  the  general 
ized  Taylor  principle.  Davig  and  Leeper  argue  that  a unique  equilibrium 
survives  if  the Taylor  rule  is  sufficiently  active  when  the  economy  is  in 
the  active  policy  regime  or  if  the  expected  length  of  time  the  economy 
will  be  in  the nonactive  policy  regime  is sufficiently  small.  To  keep  this 
paper  focused,  we  will  not  dwell  on  generating  results  equivalent  to 
Davig  and  Leeper's  in our  environment.  Suffice  it to say  that  one  further 
advantage  of  the Bayesian  approach  is that we  can handle  restrictions  on 
the  parameter  drifting  with  the  use  of  the  priors.  For  example,  we  can 
implement  a  reflecting  boundary  on  (10) by  putting  a zero  prior  on  the 
possibility  of  violating  that  boundary.  Also,  in our  empirical  analysis, 
we  estimate  7n  as being  bigger  than  1. This  suggests  that  the Taylor  prin 
ciple  will  be  satisfied,  at  least  on  average. 
Our  formulation  of  parameter  drifting  has  one  important  drawback: 
we  do  not model  explicitly  why  the parameters  change  over  time.  In sec 
tion  3, we  discuss  that  changes  in  the  policy  parameters  could  be  a  re 
flection  of  changing  political  priorities  or  evolving  perceptions  about 
the  effectiveness  of  policy.  A  more  complete  model  would  include  ex 
plicit  mechanisms  through  which  we  discipline  the movement  of  the pa 
rameters  over  time. Many  of  those mechanisms  can be  incorporated  into 
our  framework,  since  we  are  rather  flexible  with  the  type  of  functional 
forms  for  the parameter  drift  that we  can  handle. 
The  model  in  section  4  carries  on  except  with  the modification  of  (9) 
and  the  fact  that  all  the  conditional  expectations  now  incorporate  the 
process  (10). Thus,  the  states  of  the model  with  parameter  drifting  are: How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  107 
?  I  *h-i'  t-i'8t-i'8t-i'*t-i'Rt-i'yt-i'ct-i'vt-i'vt-i'  V 
' 
= 
I ?  ?  ?  ~  ?  3 j 
' 
\\t-vh-v  x-v  *-t-v  zt-v  Zv.,t-i'  "-t-v  9f-i/  zA,t-v  ^Rt-v  7m-i/  7yJ 
where  we  have  included  yRt,  ym,  and  yyt 
as  three  additional  states.  We 
will  follow  the  convention  of  separating  drifting  parameters  from  the 
other  states  with  a  semicolon  (;)  since  they  are  an  object  of  interest  by 
themselves.  Similarly,  we  apply  the  particle  filter  to evaluate  the  likeli 
hood  of  the model  and  the Metropolis-Hasting  algorithm  to  simulate 
from  the posterior. 
6  Empirical  Analysis 
This  section  presents  our  empirical  analysis.  First,  we  report  the  point 
estimates  of  the model  when  we  keep  all  parameters  fixed  over  the 
sample.  This  estimation  sets  a  natural  benchmark  for  the  rest  of  the 
study.  Second,  we  discuss  the  results  of  an  exercise  where  we  allow 
the  parameters  of  the  Taylor  rule  of  the monetary  authority  to  change 
over  time.  Third,  we  analyze  the  evolution  of  the parameters  that  control 
the  level  of  price  and  wage  rigidities.  In  the  interest  of  space  we  select 
these  two  exercises  as  particularly  illustrative  of  the  procedure  we  pro 
pose.  However,  we  could  have  performed  many  other  exercises  within  the 
framework  of  our methodology. 
We  estimate  the model  using  five  time  series  for  the United  States: 
(1)  the  relative  price  of  investment  with  respect  to  the  price  of  con 
sumption,  (2)  real  output  per  capita  growth,  (3)  hours  worked  per 
capita,  (4)  the CPI,  and  (5)  the  federal  funds  rate. Our  sample  goes  from 
1955:Q1  to 2000:Q4.  We  stop  our  sample  at  the  end  of  2000  because  of  the 
absence  of  good  information  on  the  relative  price  of  investment  after 
that  time.  To make  the  observed  series  compatible  with  the model,  we 
compute  both  real  output  and  real  gross  investment  in  consumption 
units.  For  that  purpose,  we  use  the  relative  price  of  investment  defined 
as  the  ratio  of  an  investment  deflator  and  a deflator  for  consumption. 
The  consumption  deflator  is  constructed  from  the  deflators  of  non 
durable  goods  and  services  reported  in the national  income  and  product 
accounts  (NIPA).  Since  the NIPA  investment  deflators  are  poorly  mea 
sured,  we  rely  on  the  investment  deflator  constructed  by  Fisher  (2006), 
a  series  that  ends  at  2000.-Q4.  The  appendix  provides  further  informa 
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6.1  Point  Estimation 
Before  reporting  results,  we  specify  priors  for  the model's  parameters. 
We  adopt  flat  priors  for all parameters.  We  impose  boundary  constraints 
only  to  make  the priors  proper  and  to rule  out  parameter  values  that  are 
either  incompatible  with  the model  (i.e.,  a negative  value  for  a variance, 
Calvo  parameters  outside  the unit  interval)  or  implausible  (the  response 
to  inflation  in  the  Taylor  rule  being  bigger  than  100).  The  looseness  of 
such  constraints  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  simulations  performed  in 
the  following  never  travel  even  close  to  the bounds.  Also,  we  fix  four  pa 
rameters,  (v, $,  3>2,8).  The  parameter  controlling  money  demand  v  is  ir 
relevant  for  equilibrium  dynamics  because  the  government  will  supply 
as much  money  as  required  to  implement  the nominal  interest  rate  de 
termined  by  the Taylor  rule. We  fix  the parameter  <\>  to zero,  since  we  do 
not  have  information  on  pure  profits  by  firms  (in  the  absence  of  entry/ 
exit  of  firms,  there  are  no  serious  implications  for  equilibrium  dynam 
ics). The  parameter  of  the  investment  adjustment  cost,  <$>2,  is set  to 0.001, 
and  depreciation,  8,  to 0.0149  because  they  are  difficult  to  identify.  Our 
choice  of  8  matches  the  capital-output  ratio  in  the  data  (remember  that 
in our model  we  have  both  physical  depreciation,  controlled  by  8,  and 
economic  depreciation,  induced  by  the  change  in  the  relative  price  of 
capital). 
Our  choice  of flat  priors  is  motivated  by  the  observation  that, with  this 
prior,  the  posterior  is proportional  to  the  likelihood  function.3  Conse 
quently,  our  Bayesian  results  can  be  interpreted  as  a  classical  exercise 
where  the mode  of  the  likelihood  function  (the point  estimate  under  an 
absolute  value  loss  function  for  estimation)  is  the maximum  likelihood 
estimate.  Moreover,  a  researcher  who  prefers  more  informative  priors 
can  always  reweight  the  draws  from  the  posterior  to  accommodate  his 
favorite  priors  (Geweke  1989).4 We  repeated  our  estimation  with  an  in 
formative  prior  without  finding  important  differences  in  the  results. 
Table  2.1  summarizes  our  results  by  reporting  the mean  and  the  stan 
dard  deviation  of  the  posterior.5  Most  of  our  point  estimates  coincide 
with  the  typical  findings  of  other  estimation  exercises  and  the  standard 
deviations  are  small.  Hence,  we  comment  only  on  a  few  of  them.  We 
have  a high  degree  of habit  persistence?h  is 0.88?and  we  have  a Frisch 
elasticity  of  labor  supply  of  0.74  (1 /1.36),  well  within  the bounds  of  find 
ings  in  the  recent  microeconomic  literature  (Browning,  Hansen,  and 
Heckman  1999).  The  estimates  of  elasticities  of  substitution  e and  n  are 
around  8,  implying  average  markups  of  around  14 percent. How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  109 
Table  2.1 
Point  estimates 
Point  Point  Point 
Parameter  Estimate  S.D.  Parameter  Estimate  S.D.  Parameter  Estimate  S.D. 
0  0.999  0.001  Wr  0790  0.012 
|^ 
0951  0.006 
h  0.877  0.009  yy 
0.190  0.056  p?  0.942  0.015 
i|i  8.942  0.045  \yu  1.260  0.075  a^  0.101  0.006 
fi  1.359  0.004  n  1.008  3.6e-4  \<rA  0.007  0.002 
k  7.679  0.600  a  0.255  0.011  am  0.003  8.4e-5 
ew  0.451  0.0923  e  7.957  0.1593  ad  0.060  0.003 
Xw  0.849  0.1231  t)  7.965  0.2984  <r9  0.070  0.011 
6p 
0.907  0.012 
A^ 
0.010  2.86e-4 
Xp  0.151  0.100  \AA  0.0005  4.57e-4 
The  Calvo  parameter  for price  adjustment,  0p, 
is a relatively  high  0.91, 
while  the  indexation  level,  xp/  is 0.15.  It is  tempting  to compare  our  esti 
mates  with  the microeconomic  evidence  on  the  average  duration  of 
prices  (Bils  and  Klenow  2004,  or Nakamura  and  Steinsson  2006).  How 
ever,  the  comparison  is  difficult  because  we  have  partial  indexation: 
prices  change  every  quarter  for  all producers,  a  fraction  0p 
because  pro 
ducers  reoptimize  and  a  fraction  1-0  because  of  indexation.  The  Calvo 
parameter  for wage  adjustment,  Qw, is 0.45, while  the  indexation,  xw,  is 
0.85. Our  point  estimates  imply  stronger  nominal  rigidities  in price  than 
in  wages,  in  line with  Rabanal  and  Rubio-Ramirez  (2005)  or Gali  and  Ra 
banal  (2004)  but  diverging  from  Smets  and Wouters  (2003),  who  have 
much  more  informative  priors. 
The  policy  parameters  (yR, yn,  7  ,  II)  are  quite  standard.  The  Fed 
smooths  the  interest  rate  over  time  (7R is estimated  to be  0.79),  and  re 
sponds  actively  to  inflation  (7R is 1.25)  and weakly  to  the  output  growth 
gap  (yy 
is 0.19). We  estimate  that  the Fed  has  a  target  for quarterly  infla 
tion  of  0.78  percent  (or around  3 percent  yearly). 
The  growth  rates  of  the  investment-specific  technological  change,  A  , 
and  of  the  neutral  technology,  AA,  imply  that most  of  the  growth  in  the 
U.S.  economy  (83 percent)  is  induced  by  improvements  in  the  capital 
producing  technology.  This  result  corroborates  the  importance  of mod 
elling  biased  technological  change  for understanding  growth  and  fluc 
tuations  that Greenwood,  Herkowitz,  and  Krusell  (1997  and  2000)  have 
so  forcefully  defended.  The  estimated  long-run  growth  rate  of  the  econ 
omy,  (AA +  aA J/(l 
- 
a)  is 0.4  percent  per  quarter,  or  1.6 percent  annu 110  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
ally,  roughly  the  observed  mean  in  the  sample.  Also,  the  standard  devi 
ation  c^  is  much  higher  than  vA. 
Our  estimation  serves  different  roles.  First,  it validates  our model  as  a 
promising  laboratory  for our  exercises  with  parameter  drifting.  Since  in 
the benchmark  case we  obtain  results  compatible  with  the  literature  and 
with  the basic  growth  properties  of  the U.S.  economy,  we  know  that  the 
results  with  parameter  drifting  will  indeed  come  from  that  feature  of  the 
estimation.  Second,  we  use  our  point  estimates  to  initialize  the parame 
ters  in  the  exercises  with  parameter  drifting. 
In  the next  two  subsections,  we  will  report  our  findings  when  we  al 
low  one  parameter  to vary  at  a  time. We  do  this  for  convenience.  First, 
allowing  several  parameters  to move  simultaneously  makes  the  com 
putation  and  estimation  of  the model  much  more  costly.  Second,  the  in 
formation  in  the  sample  is  limited  and  it is difficult  to obtain  stable  esti 
mates  otherwise.  Third,  especially  in our  second  exercise,  our  objective 
is not  so much  to have  the  richest  possible  model  to  fit  the  data  well  but 
to  show  that  as  soon  as  parameters  are  allowed  to  change  over  time, 
strong  signs  of misspecification  appear.  We  will  continue  the  explo 
ration  of  joint moves  of  parameters  in  the near  future. 
6.2  Evolution  of Policy  Parameters 
Our  first  exercise  studies  the  evolution  of  the  policy  parameters  in  the 
Taylor  rule.  This  investigation  evaluates  how  much  evidence  there  is  in 
the  data  of  a  changing  monetary  policy  over  time.  As  we  discussed  in 
section  3,  the  literature  has  extensively  debated  the  topic  (e.g.,  Clarida, 
Gali,  and  Gertler  2000,  Cogney  and  Sargent  2001,  Lubick  and  Schorf 
heide  2004,  Sims  and  Zha  2006,  Boivin  2006).  However,  the  empirical 
methods  applied  so  far  are  unsatisfactory  because  they  rely  either  on 
divisions  of  the  sample  that  do  not  let  the  agents  in  the model  forecast 
the  changes  in policy  or  on  the  estimation  of  reduced  forms. 
Arguably  the most  interesting  parameter  is 7m_a,  since  this  parameter 
controls  how  aggressively  the monetary  authority  responds  to  inflation. 
In  addition,  7m_a  is  intimately  linked  with  the  issue  of multiplicity  of 
equilibria  and  the possibility  of monetary  policy  being  a  source  of  insta 
bility.  Figure  2.2  plots  our  point  estimate  of  the  evolution  of  ynt_1 over 
time  plus  the  two  standard  deviations  interval  to gauge  the uncertainty 
present  in  the  estimation.  We  report  the  smoothed  values  of  ynt_x using 
the whole  sample  (Godsill,  Doucet,  and  West  2004).  We  find  it  con 
venient,  for  expositional  purposes,  to eliminate  some  of  the  quarter-to How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  Ill 
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Evolution  of  Response  to  Inflation 
quarter  variation  of  the parameter.  To  accomplish  this  goal,  in  figure  2.3 
we  graph  the  trend  of  the  change  of  the  parameter  where  we  compute 
the  trend  using  a  Hodrick-Prescott  filter. We  emphasize  that  this  trend  is 
only  a device  to  read  the  graph  more  clearly  and  lacks  a  formal  statisti 
cal  interpretation. 
In both  figures  2.2  and  2.3,7m-1  starts  low,  slightly  above  1 during  the 
1950s,  1960s,  and  early  1970s,  with  periods  when  it  was  even  below  1. 
However,  in  the mid-1970s,  and  especially  after  Volcker's  appointment 
as  chairman  of  the  Board  of Governors,  7m_1 soared.  The  response  to  in 
flation  reached  its peak  in  the  early  1980s,  where  it  was  as  high  as  6  in 
one  quarter.  After  that maximization,  7m_1  slowly  decreases  during  the 
1990s,  perhaps  reflecting  the  Fed's  more  permissive  attitude  to  accom 
modate  the  strong  productivity  growth  associated  with  the  Internet 
boom. 
Since  our  model  has  parameter  drifting,  it  is not  straightforward  to 
compare  these  numbers  with  estimates  obtained  in  fixed-parameter 
models.  However,  we  clearly  confirm  the  findings  of Clarida,  Gali,  and 
Gertler  (2000),  Lubick  and  Schorfheide  (2004),  and  Boivin  (2006)?that 
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finding  is also  consistent  with  the  results  of  figure  12  in Cogley  and  Sar 
gent  (2001), where  they  trace  the  evolution  of  the  activism  coefficient  as 
measured  by  a parameter-drifting  VAR. 
Another  parameter  of  importance  is  the  inflation  target  of  the mone 
tary  authority,  II.  Histories  like  those  in Taylor  (1998),  Sargent  (1999),  or 
Primiceri  (2006)  explain  that  the  inflation  target may  have  changed  over 
time  as  a  reflection  of  the  Fed's  varying  beliefs  about  the  trade-off  be 
tween  unemployment  and  inflation.  Figure  2.4  plots  the  evolution  of  the 
target  over  time  plus  the  two  standard  deviation  interval.  From  the  start 
of  the  sample  until  the  early  1970s  and,  later,  for  the  1990s,  II hovers 
around  1.004,  or,  in  annual  terms,  around  1.6  percent.  This  number  is 
close  to  the  informal  target  or  comfort  zone  that,  according  to many 
commentators,  describes  the  Fed's  behavior.  During  the  intermediate 
years,  the  inflation  target  increases,  reflecting  perhaps  the views  the Fed 
had  about  the  possibility  of  exploiting  the  Phillips  curve  or  illustrating 
the  information  lags  regarding  the  changing  features  of  the  economy 
emphasized  by  Orphanides  (2002). We  find  intriguing  the  similarity  of 
figure  2.4  to Romer  and  Romer's  (2002)  hypothesis,  based  on  narrative 
accounts  and  internal  Greenbook  forecasts  of  the  Fed,  that monetary How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  113 
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Evolution  of  inflation  target 
policy  in  the United  States  has  gone  through  a  long  cycle  of moderation, 
aggressiveness,  and  renewed  temperance. 
Our  estimates  of  the  evolution  of  the  inflation  target  provide  a reality 
check  on  our  procedure.  In figure  2.5, we  plot  the  inflation  target  versus 
realized  inflation.  If the  estimation  is  working  properly,  part  of  the vari 
ation  in  the  inflation  target  needs  to be  accounted  for,  in  a purely  me 
chanical  fashion,  by  changes  in  inflation.  That  is precisely  what  we  ob 
serve:  as  inflation  increases  and  then  falls  during  the  late  1960s  and 
1970s,  the  target  inflation  estimated  goes  up  and  down. 
Note,  however,  that  the  inflation  target  fluctuates  roughly  between  40 
and  50 percent  less  than  inflation.  Particularly  during  the  1970s,  the  in 
flation  target  is  well  below  actual  inflation.  This  difference  is accounted 
in  two ways.  First,  by  the  form  of  our  Taylor  rule. We  assume  that  one 
input  into  the  rule  is  the  growth  gap  between  the  growth  of  output  ydJ 
yf_1  and  the  long-run  growth  rate  of  the  economy  Ayd. 
The  1970s  were 
years  of  very  low  growth  in comparison  with 
Ayd.6 Thus,  our model  in 
terprets  the  behavior  of  the  Fed  as  lowering  the  interest  rates  as  a  re 
sponse  to  low  output  growth  in exchange  for higher  inflation.  Second, 
our model  backs  up  large  negative  technology  shocks  in  the  1970s  that 114  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
1.0451-.-.-  n 
?  Inflation Target!  104" , 
j-Inflation  \ 
1.035-  !; 
103"  ri  (\ 
1.025-  I  i  f  ! 
1.02- 
f  !(i|  J  }'| 
1015 
^  y^jj  i 
q  9951-1-1-1-1-1-l 
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Figure  2.5 
Inflation  Target  versus  Inflation 
push  inflation  above  the  target  level.  Hence,  an  alternative  way  to  think 
about  this  result  is  that  our model  suggests  that  the big  rise  in  inflation 
during  the  1970s  had  less  to do with  changes  in  the  inflation  target  than 
with  a  series  of  unfavorable  aggregate  shocks. 
We  summarize  our  results.  First,  the  Fed's  response  toward  inflation 
became  more  aggressive  in the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  and  has  stayed 
high  since  then,  with  perhaps  a  small  decline.  Second,  the  inflation  tar 
get was  relaxed  in  the  1970s,  but  not  enough  to account  for  the high  in 
flation  of  that  decade.  We  trust  our  results  not  only  because  they  come 
from  the estimation  of  a coherent  DSGE  model,  but  also  because  they  are 
consistent  with  the  findings  of  the  existing  literature  that  uses  alterna 
tive  estimation  procedures,  with  narrative  accounts  of monetary  policy, 
and with  the  reality  check  explained  previously. 
6.3  Evolution  of Price  and Wage  Rigidities 
A  key  set  of parameters  in our model  are  those  determining  the  extent  of 
price  and  wage  rigidities,  (8p/ xp,  0W,  x  J-  These  four  parameters  gener 
ate  the nominal  rigidity  in  the  economy  required  to match  the  impulse How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  115 
response  functions  documented  by VARs  (Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and 
Evans  2005). 
Given  their  importance  in  the model,  it  is unfortunate  that  these  pa 
rameters  have  only  a  tenuous  link with  microeconomic  foundations. 
Even  if the Calvo  adjustment  probabilities  are  the  reduced  form  of  a con 
vex  adjustment  cost model,  the  environment  that produces  this  reduced 
form  has  changed  over  the years  in our  sample.  We  have  gone  from  pe 
riods  of high  inflation  and  low  response  of  the monetary  authority  to ris 
ing  prices  to periods  of much  lower  inflation  and  a  more  aggressive  at 
titude  by  the  Fed  toward  inflation.  Moreover,  the  U.S.  economy  has 
experienced  a notable  level  of  deregulation,  increasing  competition  in 
internal  markets  from  international  trade,  and  lower  unionization  rates. 
The  justification  of  the  indexation  parameters  or  their  relation  to  the 
Calvo  adjustment  probabilities  is even  less  clear. Why  do  agents  index 
their  prices  and  wages?  And  if  they  do,  to which  quantity?  Past  infla 
tion?  Current  inflation?  Steady-state  inflation?  Wage  inflation?  Conse 
quently,  it  is natural  to examine  the  possibility  that  the  parameters  (0p, 
XPf  0a,/ Xw) drift  over  time,  both  as  a measure  of  how  strong  nominal 
rigidities  have  been  in each  different  moment  and  as  a  tool  to assess  the 
extent  of  possible  misspecification  of  the model  along  this  dimension. 
As  in  the  case  of  policy  parameters,  we  specify  an AR(1)  as  the  law  of 
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where 
(eM,  eXpt,  eewt/ exwt) 
are  i.i.d.  normal  shocks  and where  we  take  the 
minimum  of  the  value  of  the  parameter  induced  by  the  autoregressive 
component  and  0  to be  sure  that  the  two  standard  deviation  interval  and 
figure  2.6  its HP-trend  (again,  with  the HP-trend  of  the  CPI  superim 
posed).  Indexation  evolves  in an  opposite  way  to price  duration:  it starts 
low  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  but  raises  very  strongly  during  the  late  1960s. 
Then,  it drops  dramatically  in  the mid-1970s  and  stays  low  over  the next 
20  years  (except  for  a  temporary  increase  in  the  early  1980s).  In  the  last 
part  of  the  sample,  during  the  1990s,  \pt  steadily  drops.  The  drop  in  in 
dexation  in  the  second  half  of  the  1970s  may  be  accounted  for by  firms 116  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
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HP-Trend  Price  Indexation  vs.  HP-Trend  Inflation 
switching  to more  often  optimal  price  adjustments  and  less  automatic 
pricing  rules.  Firms  were  perhaps  induced  by  the  volatile  inflation  of 
those  years,  which  made  partial  indexation  a  costly  option.  Mechani 
cally,  our  estimation  finds  less  indexation  because  inflation  is  less  per 
sistent  in  the  1970s. 
We  find  it illuminating  to combine  the evolution  of  the Calvo  parameter 
0  ,  and  of  indexation  xpt We  do  so  in  figure  2.7  (for  their  levels)  and  in fig 
ure  2.8  (for  their HP-trends).  The  comparison  of  both  parameters  shows 
that periods  of high  price  rigidities  are  also  periods  of  low  indexation.  The 
converse  is  true  as well,  except  for  the mid-1970s.  This  result  points  out 
that  adding  indexation  as  an  ad hoc  procedure  to  increase  the  level  of  in 
flation  inertia may  hide  important  dynamics  in price  adjustments. 
We  repeat  our  two  experiments  for wages.  Figure  2.9  (in  levels)  and 
figure  2.10  (in HP-trends,  with  inflation  superimposed)  plot  the  evolu 
tion  of  the  average  duration  of  the  spell  before  workers  reoptimize 
wages,  1(/1 
- 
Qwt), in quarter  terms.  In  this  case  the  evidence  is  more  dif 
ficult  to  interpret,  with  a big  spike  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s,  which 
is probably  due  to sampling  uncertainty.  However,  it is still  the  case  that 
during  the  1970s,  as  inflation  went  up,  wage  rigidity  went  down,  and  as 
inflation  was  tamed  in  the  early  1980s,  wages  again  became  more  rigid. 
Figures  2.11  and  2.12  draw  the  evolution  of wage  indexation.  Here,  in 1,-,-,-,-.-rn  0.6 
if 
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comparison,  the  clarity  of  the  result  is embarrassing:  wage  indexation  is 
nearly  the perfect  mirror  of  inflation.  As  we  did  for prices,  we  interpret 
this  finding  as  the natural  consequence  of workers  switching  to  more  of 
ten wage  reoptimizations  that make  indexation  less  of  an  interesting 
rule  in  times  of high  inflation.8  Less  wage  indexation  is  what  the model 
needs  to capture  the higher  volatility  of  inflation  in  the data. 
For  completeness,  we  finish  our  graphical  display  with  figures  2.13  to 
2.18, where  we  plot  the  evolution  of  the different  parameters  controlling 
nominal  rigidities  against  other.  Because  of  space  constraints,  we  refrain 
from  further  discussion  of  the plots.  However,  the  reader  can  appreciate How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  121 
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that  the  similarity  in  the  evolution  of  the parameters  over  time  solidifies 
our  confidence  that we  are  uncovering  a  systematic  pattern  of  relation 
ships  between  nominal  rigidities  and  inflation. 
We  consider  our  findings  to be  strong  proof  of  the  changing  nature 
of  the  nominal  rigidities  in  the  economy  and  of  a  strong  indication  of 
model  misspecification  along  the  dimension  of  price  and  wage  adjust 
ment.  Calvo's  price  adjustment  cannot  capture  the  evolution  of  the  pa 
rameters  are  less  than  1  in  levels  (they  will  always  be more  than  0 be 
cause  we  are  taking  logs). 
We  first  report  the  experiment  where  we  let 
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price  changes,  evolve  over  time. We  find  it  more  informative  (and more 
directly  comparable  to  the micro  evidence)  to  report  the  average  dura 




terms.  Figure  2.19  plots  that  duration  while  figure  2.20  plots  the Hodrick 
and  Prescott  (HP)-trend  and,  for  comparison  purposes,  the HP-trend  of 
the  consumer  price  index  (CPI).  In  this  figure,  as  in all  the  rest  of  the  fig 
ures  of  the  paper  where  we  plot  two  different  variables,  we  follow  the 
convention  that  the  continuous  line  represents  the parameter  on  the  left 
y-axis  and  the discontinuous  one  the parameter  on  the  right  y-axis.7 
Figures  2.19  and  2.20  reveal  a clear  pattern:  average  duration  was  high 
in  the  late  1950s,  dropped  quickly  in  the  1960s,  and  only  started  to pick 
up  in  the  late  1970s,  continuing  with  an upward  trend  until  today.  Inter 
estingly  enough,  the  changes  in  the  average  duration  of  the  spell  before 
the  producers  reoptimize  are  strongly  correlated  with  changes  in  infla 
tion.  In  figure  2.20  we  see  how  times  of  increasing  trend  inflation  (late 
1960s,  1970s)  are  times  of  falling  average  duration  and  vice  versa:  how 
times  of decreasing  trend  inflation  (the  1980s  and  the  1990s)  are  times  of 
increasing  average  duration. 
Our  second  experiment  regarding  price  rigidities  is with  \pt,  the  pa 
rameter  that  controls  price  indexation.  Figure  2.21  plots  the  evolution  of 10  I->-1-i-n  0.04 
v.  \  .  r^y  c 
o  x^  >~^  \ 
- 
o'-'-'- 
-'-^  0 
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Period 
Figure  2.20 
HP-Trend  Price  Rigidity  vs.  HP-Trend  Inflation 
t\  I Am 11  A.  A  05  l\l  lMI n  Ailh  l  i 
* 
03 r  Jl a  a/  n  n\l!  Xl\  H  H W  /. 
?'3jiltxllN  *H  aK  A^NT 
0.1  - W  "  '  f V  u  V  . 
0I-,-1-,-,-L. 
1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Period 
Figure  2.21 
Price  Indexation 124  Fernandez-Villaverde  and Rubio-Ramirez 
the parameter  over  the  sample  plus  the  fundamentals  that  determine  the 
pricing  decisions  of  firms  and  households.  Our  results  underscore  that 
this  problem  is relevant  empirically.  Also,  they  suggest  that  the  evidence 
in Klenow  and  Kryvtsov  (2005)?that  the  intensive  margin  of  price 
changes  accounts  for  95  percent  of  the monthly  variance  of  inflator? 
may  be  a product  of  the  sample  period  (1988-2003),  where  the  low  level 
of  inflation  limits  identification  because  it eliminates  the  source  of  vari 
ation  of  the  data.  Indeed,  in our  figures  2.7  and  2.8,  if  we  look  at  the pe 
riod  1988-2000,  we  observe  less  variation  in  the pricing  parameters. 
There  are  at  least  two  possible  sources  for  this misspecification  of  the 
pricing  mechanism  of  the model  that  could  rationalize  our  findings. 
First,  time-varying  price  and wage  rigidity  parameters  may  be  revealing 
a problem  of  omitted  variables.  For  example,  a change  in  the probability 
of  price  adjustment  translates  into  a  different  slope  of  the  (implicit) 
Phillips  curve  in our model  and  thus,  into  a variation  of  inflation.  How 
ever,  in  the data,  there  are  other  shocks  that  affect  inflation,  like  the price 
of  energy,  the price  of  commodities,  or  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  Since 
we  do  not  include  these  shocks,  we  may  be  capturing  the  changing  in 
fluence  of  these  sources  of  inflation  through  variations  in  the Calvo  pa 
rameters.9 
The  second  source  of misspecification  may  be  the  time-dependent 
structure  of pricing  (either  a  la Calvo  as  in  the model  we  have  presented 
or  a  la Taylor).  Thus,  we  can  read  our  results  as  favoring  models  of 
state-dependent  pricing  (Caballero  and  Engel  1999,  Caplin  and  Leahy 
1991  and  1997),  since  those  have  an  endogenously  changing  duration 
of  prices  and  wages.  The  extra  analytical  difficulty  implied  by  state 
dependent  models  (Dotsey,  King,  and Wolman  1999) may  be  a price  we 
are  forced  to pay.  Another  strand  of  the  literature  that may  consider  our 
results  interesting  is the one  that  deals  with  sticky  information  (Mankiw 
and  Reiss  2002,  and  Sims  2002).  Higher  inflation  increases  the  incentives 
to  gather  information  and,  hence,  it  is  likely  to  imply  more  frequent 
price  and wage  adjustments. 
Finally,  our  findings  have  relevant  implications  for optimal  policy  de 
sign.  First,  if  we  interpret  the  evolution  of  parameters  like  0  ,  as  exoge 
nously  given,  it  may  be  something  that  the monetary  authority  may  con 
dition  its behavior  on  (we  do  not  enter  into  a discussion  of how  it  would 
estimate  them  in real  time, we  only  raise  this  as  a  theoretical  possibility). 
Second,  if  we  real  our  results  as  showing  that  the measured  amount  of 
price  rigidities  are  endogenous  to monetary  policy,  optimal  design  be 
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7  Conclusion 
How  structural  are  the  structural  parameters  of DSGE  models?  Less  so 
than  we  often  claim.  Our  analysis  indicates  that  there  are  large  varia 
tions  in the  estimated  values  of  several  of  the key  parameters  of  a bench 
mark  medium-scale  macroeconomic  model  during  our  sample  period. 
We  document  changes  in the  response  of  the monetary  authority  to  in 
flation  and  in the  inflation  target  that  confirm  previous  findings  by  other 
researchers.  In particular,  we  report  a  move  by  the  Fed  toward  a much 
more  aggressive  stand  against  raising  prices  in  the  late  1970s.  Also,  we 
find  that  changes  in  the  inflation  target  account,  at most,  for 40  to 50 per 
cent  of  the  increase  in  inflation  in  the  1970s.  Our  results  are  remarkable 
because  they  are  derived  in a context  where  agents  understand  that pol 
icy  evolves  over  time  and  respond  to  that  evolution. 
We  uncover  that  the parameters  controlling  nominal  rigidities  drift  in 
a  substantial  way,  and more  important,  are  strongly  correlated  with  in 
flation.  These  findings  cast  serious  doubts  on  the  usefulness  of models 
based  on  Calvo  pricing  and  invite  deeper  investigations  of  state 
dependent  pricing  models. 
We  do  not  want  our work  to be  interpreted  as  a  sweeping  criticism  of 
the  estimation  of  DSGE  models,  because  it  is not.  The  literature  has 
made  impressive  progress  over  the  last years  and  has  contributed  much 
to  improving  our  understanding  of  aggregate  fluctuations  and  the  ef 
fects  of  economic  policy.  We  ourselves  have  been  engaged  in  this  re 
search  agenda  and  plan  to continue  doing  so.  We  hope,  instead,  that  our 
paper  will  be  read  as  an  invitation  to  further  estimation  of DSGE  mod 
els with  parameter  drifting.  This  avenue  is promising,  both  as  a  mecha 
nism  for  incorporating  richer  dynamics  and  as  a diagnostic  tool  for de 
tecting  gross  misspecifications. 
In  fact,  as  our  discussants  have  rightly  pointed  out,  much  remains  to 
be  done.  We  have  only  scratched  the  surface  of  the  problem  of  estimat 
ing DSGE  models  with  parameter  drifting.  We  have  not  explored  the 
model  when  we  have  different  sources  of variations  in  the parameters  at 
the  same  time  or when  there  is  stochastic  volatility  in  the  shocks.  Also, 
we  have  not  studied  the  consequences  of  drifting  parameters  for  the dy 
namics  of  the business  cycle  or  for  the  impulse-response  functions  of  the 
model.  Finally,  we  have  not  evaluated  different  specifications  of param 
eter  drift  or  analyzed  the possible  reasons  for parameter  drifting  in de 
tail. 
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eters  is not  a  call  to perform  reduced-form  exercises.  Along  with  Tom 
Sargent  and  Mark  Watson  (Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
2007),  we  have  singled  out  some  of  the problems  of  estimating  reduced 
form  models.  But  there  are many  other  papers  emphasizing  the weak 
nesses  of  reduced-form  inference.  The  fundamental  point  is  that  every 
empirical  procedure  has  strengths  and  limitations.  As  Hurwicz  (1962) 
warned  us  many  years  ago,  just  because  we  name  something  "struc 
tural/7  we  should  not  believe  we  have  taken  the  theoretical  high  ground. 
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Endnotes 
1.  Indeed,  Hurwicz  (1962)  himself  emphasized  the  contingency  of  the  definition  of  struc 
tural  parameters:  "the  concept  of  structure  is  relative  to  the  domain  of modifications  antici 
pated";  "If  two  individuals  differ  with  regard  to  modifications  they  are willing  to  consider, 
they  will  probably  differ  with  regard  to  the  relations  accepted  as  structural,"  and  "this  rel 
ativity  of  the  concept  of  structure  is due  to  the  fact  that  it represents  not  a property  of  the ma 
terial  system  under  observation,  but  rather  a property  of  the  anticipations  of  those  asking  for 
predictions  concerning  the  state  of  the  system"  (p.  238;  italics  in  the  original). 
2.  The  autoregressive  coefficients  (pR, pm,  p  ) and  the matrix  Q  become  in  this  formulation 
the  new  structural  parameters.  We  are  also  skeptical  about  their  true  structural  nature,  but 
to  avoid  the  infinite  regression  problem,  we  will  ignore  our  doubts  for  the moment. 
3.  There  is  a  small  qualifier:  the  bounded  support  of  the  priors.  We  can  fix  this  small  dif 
ference  by  thinking  about  those  bounds  as  frontiers  of  admissible  parameter  values  in  a 
classical  perspective. 
4. We  do  not  argue  that  our  flat  priors  are  uninformative.  After  a  reparameterization  of 
the model,  a  flat  prior  may  become  highly  curved.  Moreover,  if we  wanted  to  use  the 
model  for  other  purposes  like  forecasting  or  to  compare  it  with,  for  example,  a VAR,  we 
would  need  to  elicit  our  priors  more  carefully. How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  127 
5.  A  word  of  caution  here:  the  estimates  of  the  standard  deviation  with  the  particle  filter 
are  relatively  unstable  (Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  2007,  and  Dejong, 
Dharmarajan,  Liesenfeld,  and  Richard  2007).  Computational  constraints  preclude  us  from 
running  a  simulation  sufficiently  long  to  fully  avoid  this  problem. 
6.  This  observation  may  have  motivated  a model  where 
Ayd  changes  over  time,  but  such 
models  are,  as  argued  by  Bansal  and  Yaron  (2004),  quite  difficult  to  estimate  in  small 
samples. 
7. We  do  not  plot  the  standard  deviations  interval  for  the  average  price  duration  (nor  later 
for  the  average  wage  duration)  because  the  transformation  1(/1 
- 
Qpt) generates  implausi 
bly  large  upper  bounds  as  soon  as  the  simulation  of 
Qpt 
travels  close  to  1. The  standard  de 
viations  interval  for 
Qpt show,  however,  that  the  parameter  itself  is  estimated  without  too 
much  uncertainty. 
8.  During  the  early  1970s,  there  was  a  raise  in  the  prevalence  of  cost-of-living  allowance 
(COLA)  escalators  in  collective  bargaining  agreements  (Hendricks  and  Kahn  1985).  This 
observation  could  be  used  to undermine  our  result.  However,  even  at  their  peak,  COLAs 
only  covered  6  million  workers,  a  small  percentage  of  the  labor  force.  Moreover,  it  is diffi 
cult  to map  COLAs  from  the  1970s  into  our  model,  since  they  had  many  contingent  rules 
that make  them  quite  different  from  the naive  indexation  rules  that we  use.  In  fact,  it could 
even  be  possible  to  think  about  a  state-contingent  COLA  as  an  implicit  form  of  reopti 
mization. 
9.  Similarly,  part  of  the  variation  in  the  Calvo  parameters  may  be  accounted  for  by 
markup  shocks,  which  play  an  important  role  in  models  like  Smets  and  Wouters'  (2003). 
However,  it  is difficult  to  see which  type  of markup  shocks  will  have  the  level  of  persist 
ence  that we  observe  in  the movements  of  the Calvo  parameters  that we  estimate. 
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8.  Appendix 
This  appendix  offers  further  details  about  the  technical  aspects  of  the pa 
per.  First,  we  discuss  some  general  computational  aspects  and  elaborate 
on  the  solution  of  the model.  Second,  we  describe  the  particle  filter  that 
evaluates  the  likelihood  function  of  the model.  Third,  we  comment  on 
the  estimation  procedure.  Fourth,  we  close  with  the  details  of  the  con 
struction  of  the  data. 
8.1  Computation  of  the  Model 
The  most  important  feature  of  the  algorithm  to be  described  below  to 
solve  and  estimate  the model  is  that  it can  be  implemented  on  a good 
desktop  computer.  We  coded  all  programs  for  the  perturbation  of  the 
model  and  the  particle  filter  in Fortran  95  and  compiled  them  in  Intel 
Visual  Fortran  9.1  to  run  on Windows-based  machines  (except  some 
Mathematica  programs  to generate  analytic  derivatives).  We  use  a Xeon 
Processor  5160  EMT64  at  3.00  GHz  with  16 GB  of RAM. 
The  solution  of  the model  is  challenging  because  we  have  19  state 
variables  plus  the  drifting  parameters  that we  allow  in  each  empirical 
exercise.  Moreover,  we  need  to  recompute  the  solution  of  the model  for 
each  new  set  of parameter  values  in  the  estimation.  The  only  non-linear 
procedure  that  accomplishes  this  computation  in  a  reasonable  amount 
of  time  is  perturbation  (Aruoba,  Fernandez-Villaverde,  and  Rubio 
Ramirez  2006).  We  implement  our  solution  by  perturbing  the  equilib 
rium  conditions  of  the  rescaled  version  of  the model  (i.e.,  the  one  where 
we  have  already  eliminated  the  two  unit  roots)  around  the  determinis How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  133 
tic  steady  state.  This  means  that  the  solution  is  locally  accurate  regard 
less  of  the  level  of  technology  in  the  economy.  Also,  note  that  the  steady 
state will  depend  on  the  level  of  inflation  targeted  by  the monetary  au 
thority. 
We  use Mathematica  to compute  the  analytical  derivatives  and  to gen 
erate  Fortran  95  code with  the  corresponding  analytical  expression.  Then, 
we  load  that  output  into  a  Fortran  95  code  that  evaluates  the  solution 
of  the model  for  each  parameter  value  as  implied  by  the Metropolis 




r5l(s;,e;)'  + 
|(s;/e;)rs2(s;,e;)' 
+ rs3 (13) 
where,  recalling  our  notation,  St are  the  states,  et are  the  shocks,  Jt is a 
vector  of variables  of  interest  in the model  that  are not  states,  and  the TJs 
are matrices  of  the  right  size. With  (13),  and  by  selecting  the  appropriate 
rows,  we  build  the  state  space  representation: 
sf+1 
= 
%&,  e;y + 
|(s;, 
e;)*s2(s;, e;y + %3 
w  = 
vjs;,  e;)' + 
|(s;, 
e't)%2(s't,  e/y + %3 
where  S, 
= 
(S't, S[_v  e^)  and W  = 
(A log  \l~\ A  log  yt, A  log  /?  log  Ylt,  log 
R,)'. 
8.2  Description  of  the Particle  Filter 
We  provide  now  a  short  description  of  the  particle  filter. We  will  delib 
erately  focus  on  the  intuition  of  the  procedure  and  we  will  gloss  over 
many  technical  issues  that  are  relevant  for  a successful  application  of  the 
filter. We  direct  the  interested  reader  to Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Ru 
bio-Ramirez  (2007), where  we  discuss  most  of  those  issues  in detail,  and 
the  articles  in Doucet,  de  Freitas,  and  Gordon  (2001), which  present  im 
proved  sequential  Monte  Carlo  algorithms,  like  Pitt  and  Shephard's 
(1999)  auxiliary  particle  filter. 
As  we  described  in  the main  text,  given  the Markov  structure  of  our 
state  space  representation,  we  can  factorize  the  likelihood  function  as: 
T  i 
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and  obtain  the  factorization: 
?(YT;  ?)  = 
j  ?(Ya |  S0;  V)dS0  U  \  2{\  I  S,;  V)p(St I  Y"; V)dSt  (14) 
t=2 
Consequently,  if  we  had  the  sequence  (p(St  I  Y'_1;  yir))J=1  and  p(S0;  'VP),  we 
could  evaluate  the  likelihood  of  the model.  Santos  and  Peralta-Alva 
(2005)  show  conditions  under  which  we  can  draw  the  numerical  solu 
tion  of  the model  to approximate  p(S0;  yir).  The  two  difficulties  of  evalu 
ation  (14)  are  then  to  characterize  the  sequence  of  conditional  distribu 
tions[p(SJ  Y'-1;  ^)]J=1  and  to  compute  the  different  integrals  in  the 
expression. 
The  particle  filter  begins  from  the  observation  that,  if  somehow  we 
can  get  N  draws  of  the  form 
[(s^.JJlJJlj  from  the  sequence  (p(St  \  Yf_1; 
^))J=i,  we  can  appeal  to a  law  of  large  numbers  and  substitute  the  inte 
grals  with  a  mean  of  the  conditional  likelihoods  evaluated  in  the  empir 
ical draws: 
XOT;  ?)  ? 1 
f  2>(%  I  s<  |o;  ?)?  -J-  ?  <g(Y,  I  sj,,.,; <J>) 
where  our  notation  for  the  draws  indicates  in  the  subindex  the  condi 
tioning  set  (i.e.,  t\t  -1  means  a draw  at moment  t conditional  on  infor 
mation  until  t  -1)  and  the  superindex  denotes  the  index  of  the draw.  The 
intuition  of  the  procedure  is  that we  substitute  the  exact  but  unknown 
sequence  [p(St\ Yf_1;  <lIr)]fs=1  by  its empirical  counterpart. 
How  do  we  draw  from  [p(St  \  Y'-1; ^)],T=1?  The  second  key  idea  of  the 
particle  filter  is that we  can  extend  importance  sampling  (Geweke  1989) 
to a  sequential  environment.  The  following  proposition,  due  in  its orig 
inal  form  to Rubin  (1988),  formalizes  the  idea: 
Proposition  1.  Let  fsj|f_1JJl1 be a draw from  p(St  I  Y'~2; V).  Let  the  sequence 
[s\]y=1 be a draw with  replacement  from  ls\\t_^=1  where  the resampling  proba 
bility is  given by 
i=  Jg(Yjs;u_i;^)  q' 
iJli^Xls;,^;^)' 
Then (s,f)Jl1  is a draw  from p(St |  Y';  ?). 
The  proposition  1 shows  how  to  recursively  use  a draw  (sjj^)^  from 
p(St  |  Y'"1;  V)  to get  a draw  (s\ u)^  from  p(St  I  Y';  Mf). This  result  is crucial. How  Structural  Are  Structural  Parameters?  135 
It allows  us  to  incorporate  the  information  in Yt  to change  our  current  es 
timate  of  St. This  is  why  this  step  is known  in  filtering  theory  as update 
(the  discerning  reader  has  probably  already  realized  that  this  update  is 
nothing  more  than  an  application  of  Bayes'  theorem). 
The  resampling  step  is key  for  the  success  of  the  filter. A  naive  exten 
sion  of Monte  Carlo  techniques  will  just  draw  a whole  sequence  of 
[(sJU-i)/ljr=i  without  stopping  period  by  period  to  resample  according 
to proposition  1.  Unfortunately,  this  naive  scheme  diverges.  The  reason 
is  that  all  the  sequences  become  arbitrarily  far  away  from  the  true  se 
quence  of  states,  which  is  a  zero  measure  set  and  the  sequence  that  is 
closer  to  the  true  states  dominates  all  the  remaining  ones  in weight.  A 
simple  simulation  shows  that  the  degeneracy  appears  even  after  very 
few  steps. 
Given  (s\  \  t)^=1,  we  draw  N  exogenous  shocks,  something  quite  simple, 
since  the  shocks  in our model  e|+1 
= 
(e'M+1, e^+1,  e^+1,  e^+1/  e^+1)' 
are 
normally  distributed.  Then,  we  apply  the  law  of motion  for  states  that 
relates  the  s\\t and  the  shocks  e|+1  to generate  (sj+1 \t)^Lv  This  step,  known 
as  forecast,  put  us  back  at  the  beginning  of  proposition  1, but  with  the 
difference  that  we  have  moved  forward  one  period  in  our  condi 
tioning. 
The  following  pseudocode  summarizes  the  description  of  the  algo 
rithm: 
Step  0,  Initialization:  Set  t ~> 1. Sample  N  values  (s[)|0)Jl1fromp(S0;^r). 
Step  1, Prediction:  Sample  N  values  (s\  |  f_1)Jl1  using  (sj_21t^)^,  the  law  of 
motion  for  states  and  the  distribution  of  shocks  er 
Step  2,  Filtering:  Assign  to  each  draw  (sj,^)  the weight  q\  in proposi 
tion  1. 
Step  3, Sampling:  Sample  N  times  with  replacement  from  (s\  \  ^_1)J11  using 
the probabilities  (q\)^=v  Call  each  draw  (sj, t). If t  <  T  set  t ~>  t +  1 and  go 
to  step  1.  Otherwise  stop. 
With  the  output  of  the  algorithm,  we  just  substitute  into  our  formula 
^(Y^;  ?) - 1 
f  2(X  I  ^|0;  ?) n  ^  I  2(Y,I S}|t_i;  M>)  (15) 
and  get  an  estimate  of  the  likelihood  of  the model.  Del  Moral  and  Jacod 
(2002)  and  Kiinsch  (2005)  show  weak  conditions  under  which  the  right 
hand  side  of  the previous  equation  is a consistent  estimator  of  !?(YT;  V) 
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8.3  Estimation  Procedure 
We  mention  in  the main  part  of  the  text  that  the posterior  of  the model 
p(M'|YT)oc??(Yr;M')p(M') 
is difficult,  if not  impossible,  to  characterize.  However,  we  can  draw 
from  it and  build  its empirical  counterpart  using  a  Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm.  The  algorithm  is as  follows: 
Step  0,  Initialization:  Set  i ~> 0 and  an  initial  Mr. Solve  the model  for  M*. 
and  build  the  state  space  representation.  Evaluate  prior  p(M^)  and  ap 
proximate  ^(YT;  MO  with  (15).  Set  i->  i +  1. 
Step  1, Proposal  draw:  Get  a draw  M'f  from  a proposal  density  q{yt_lf yf). 
Step  2,  Solving  the Model:  Solve  the model  for  M'f  and  build  the  new 
state  space  representation. 
Step  3,  Evaluating  the  proposal:  Evaluate  p(Vf)  and  ^(YT;  M'f) with 
(15). 
Step  4, Accept/Reject:  Draw  Xi 
~ 
U(0,1).  If x, ^  [^(VT; ^*)p(^*)^w/ 
M'f )]/[^(YT;  M'f_1)p(%1)(/(M'f, %_,)]  set  Mr  = 
M'f,  otherwise  Mr - 
%v 
Step  5,  Iteration:  If  i  < M,  set  i~*i  +  1 and  go  to  step  1. Otherwise  stop. 
This  algorithm  requires  us  to  specify  a proposal  density  q{-,  ).  We  fol 
low  the  standard  practice  and  choose  a random  walk  proposal,  M'f 
= 
M^ 
+  k  .,  Kf 
~ 
>f(0,  XK),  where  ZK is a  scaling  matrix.  This  matrix  is selected  to 
get  the  appropriate  acceptance  ratio  of proposals  (Roberts,  Gelman,  and 
Gilks  1997). 
To  reduce  the  "chatter"  of  the  problem,  we  will  keep  the  innovations 
in  the  particle  filter  (i.e.,  the  draws  from  the  exogenous  shock  distribu 
tions  and  the  resampling  probabilities)  constant  across  different  passes 
of  the Metropolis-Hastings  algorithm.  As  pointed  out  by  McFadden 
(1989)  and  Pakes  and  Pollard  (1989),  this  is required  to achieve  stochas 
tic equicontinuity,  and  even  if the  condition  is not  strictly  necessary  in a 
Bayesian  framework,  it  reduces  the  numerical  variance  of  the  proce 
dure. 
8.4  Construction  of Data 
As  we  mention  in  the  text, we  compute  both  real  output  and  real  gross 
investment  in  consumption  units  to make  the  observed  series  compat 
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tio of  the  investment  deflator  and  the deflator  for  consumption.  The  con 
sumption  deflator  is  constructed  from  the  deflators  of  nondurable 
goods  and  services  reported  in the NIPA.  Since  the NIPA  investment  de 
flators  are poorly  measured,  we  use  the  investment  deflator  constructed 
by  Fisher  (2006).  For  the  real  output  per  capita  series,  we  first  define 
nominal  output  as  nominal  consumption  plus  nominal  gross  invest 
ment.  We  define  nominal  consumption  as  the  sum  of  personal  con 
sumption  expenditures  on  nondurable  goods  and  services,  national  de 
fense  consumption  expenditures,  federal  nondefense  consumption 
expenditures,  and  state  and  local  government  consumption  expendi 
tures. We  define  nominal  gross  investment  as  the  sum  of  personal  con 
sumption  expenditures  on  durable  goods,  national  defense  gross  in 
vestment,  federal  government  nondefense  gross  investment,  state  and 
local  government  gross  investment,  private  nonresidential  fixed  invest 
ment,  and  private  residential  fixed  investment.  Per  capita  nominal  out 
put  is defined  as  the  ratio  between  our  nominal  output  series  and  the 
civilian  noninstitutional  population  between  16  and  65.  Since  we  need 
to  measure  real  output  per  capita  in  consumption  units,  we  deflate  the 
series  by  the  consumption  deflator.  For  the  real  gross  investment  per 
capita  series,  we  divide  our  above  mentioned  nominal  gross  investment 
series  by  the  civilian  noninstitutional  population  between  16 and  65  and 
the  consumption  deflator.  Finally,  the hours  worked  per  capita  series  is 
constructed  with  the  index  of  total  number  of hours  worked  in  the busi 
ness  sector  and  the  civilian  noninstitutional  population  between  16 and 
65.  Since  our model  implies  that hours  worked  per  capita  are  between  0 
and  1,  we  normalize  the  observed  series  of hours  worked  per  capita  such 
that  it is, on  average,  0.33. 